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In the United States and around the world, one of the most controversial
forms of speech or expression is "hate speech" - a phrase that is not a
legal term of art but is widely used to denote speech that conveys hateful
or discriminatory views on bases such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
and sexual orientation. Debates about hate speech restrictions rage
globally in light of free speech concerns. The most consequential debate
today concerns how dominant online platforms (the "Platforms") should
define the hate speech that warrants removal or restriction under their
content moderation policies. Given the unprecedented volume of
communications posted to the Platforms, the Platforms remove or restrict
hundreds of thousands of communications as proscribed hate speech on a
daily basis. Nor does a day go by without complaints from Platform users
across the ideological spectrum, alleging that the Platforms write and
enforce their hate speech policies in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner.

In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Platforms have become the
most important forums for the exchange of information and ideas,
including by and about public officials, and also about public affairs. As
the Court has declared, such speech is "more than a matter of selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government." In short, the Platforms
have supplanted traditional government forums for the exercise of free
speech, and the Platforms also exercise censorial power on a scale that, in
the past, only governments have wielded. But the Platforms are not "state
actors." Thus, the Platforms' content moderation policies are not
constrained by the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, or any other
checks that the U.S. Constitution places on governmental speech
restrictions. To the contrary, in designing and implementing content
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moderation policies, Platforms are exercising their own First Amendment
rights, which the U.S. government would violate if it acted to control those
policies.
Alternative tools are required to rein in the Platforms' vast censorial
power and to promote both individual free speech and democratic
discourse. One proposal that recently has gained traction was advanced in
2018 by law professor David Kaye, then the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on free speech. Invoking the U.N. 2011 Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, Kaye urged the Platforms to align their
content moderation policies with the international human rights standards
delineated in U.N. treaties and in relatively recent speech-protective
reports that have been issued by U.N. officials and bodies authorized to
interpret those treaties.
This Article builds on the analysis of Kaye and other experts who have
endorsed this approach, based on speech-protective U.N. standards. The
Article analyzes the pertinent U.N. treaty provisions and interpretive
materials, and it shows that their key speech-protective principles dovetail
with those in recent U.S. First Amendment law. It also explains why this
approach is the most feasible for restraining the Platforms' vast censorial
power and for facilitating the Platforms' resistance to government
suppression pressures, while also respecting the Platforms' own free
expression rights.
This Article recognizes that the complex body of U.N. treaty provisions
and interpretations, as well as U.S. First Amendment caselaw, contain not
only speech-protective elements, but also elements that reflect a narrower
view of protected speech. This Article quotes experts who maintain that
the overall trend in U.N. standards is toward increased speech protection;
it also urges free speech proponents to promote the speech-protective
aspects of the U.N. regime both within the U.N. system itself, and also as
the basis for the Platforms' content moderation policies.
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[F]reedom of expression advocates should actively seek to entrench the
victories that have been achieved both in the text of [certain United
Nations (U.N.) treaty provisions] and in the most recent interpretations
by the U.N. human rights machinery. These advocates should pursue an
active strategy of stealing victory (broad speech protections) from the
jaws of potential defeat (other U.N. treaty provisions and interpretations
that are less speech-protective) by promoting consistent application of
positive interpretations recommended by the U.N. machinery.
- Evelyn Aswad, Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law,
University of Oklahoma College of Law (2020)2
United Nations entities should ... encourage [social media] companies.
.. [to] align their content policies on hate speech with international
human rights norms and standards ... [and to] develop tools that promote
individual autonomy, security and free expression, and involve deamplification, de-monetization, education, counter-speech, reporting,
and training as alternatives, when appropriate, to the banning of accounts
and the removal of content.
- U.N. Strategy and Plan ofAction on Hate Speech, Detailed Guidance
on Implementationfor U.N. Field Presences (September 2020)3
[Under] [t]he international human rights framework ...
[nation] States
should generally deploy tools . . . other than criminalization and
prohibition, such as education, counter-speech and the promotion of
pluralism, to address all kinds of hate speech.
-

U.N. SpecialRapporteuron Freedom of Speech, David Kaye (2019)4

In many countries, overbroad [hate speech] rules ... are abused by the
powerful to limit non-traditional, dissenting, critical, or minority voices,
or discussion about challenging social issues. Hate speech . . . laws
2.
Evelyn Mary Aswad, To Protect Freedom of Expression, Why Not Steal
Victoryfrom the Jaws ofDefeat?, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609, 655-56 (2020) [hereinafter

Aswad 2020].
3. United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech: Detailed
Guidance on Implementation for United Nation Field Presences, at 25-39 (2020)
[hereinafter Detailed Guidance].
4. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (2019) [hereinafter 2019
Special Rapporteur on Free Speech].
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ironically are often employed to suppress the very minorities they
purportedly are designed to protect.
-

U.N. Human Rights Committee (2016)
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INTRODUCTION

A major free speech issue, which long has been debated in the United
States (U.S.) and around the world, and which has been the focus of
recently burgeoning debates about online speech, is how to regulate "hate
speech"- speech that conveys hateful or discriminatory views on the
basis of identity factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual
orientations -consistent with applicable freedom of speech norms. The
worldwide importance of this issue is underscored by the 2019 launch of
the United Nations (U.N.) Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech,
announced by U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres. 6 This Article
focuses on what is undoubtedly the most consequential issue in terms of
which hate speech is permitted worldwide, and which is not. Specifically,
given the outsized role that the dominant transnational online platforms
(the "Platforms") play in our global communications systems, this
supremely consequential issue is what content moderation standards
Platforms should implement and enforce for hate speech.
To illustrate the preeminent practical consequence of this issue,
consider just one statistic: in Facebook's most recent "Community
Standards Enforcement Report," for the fourth quarter of 2020, it reported
that each day it was removing, or otherwise "taking action on,"
approximately 437,000 posts on Facebook and Instagram that were
deemed to constitute prohibited hate speech.7
This number bears
5.

"Hate speech" is not a legal term of art under either U.S. or international human

rights law, nor is there any societal consensus about the term's specific meaning. The laws
of various countries, as well as U.N. treaties, define the concept differently (often without
using the term "hate speech"). In the U.S., there is no legal definition at all because
Supreme Court Justices of all ideological stripes, since the 1960s, have consistently
rejected the contention that speech conveying hateful or discriminatory messages should,
for that reason, be excluded from First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (reaffirming that "the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.")
(citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). Throughout this article, the term
"hate speech" is used to convey the meaning stated in the main text, because this is the
general sense in which the term is used in applicable law and in everyday speech.
6. See generally United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech
(2019).
7.
See Guy Rosen, Community Standards Enforcement Report, Fourth Quarter
2020, FACEBOOK (Feb. 11, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/community-

standards-enforcement-report-q4-
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repetition and reflection: in just one single day, just one Platform,
enforcing just one of many content moderation standards, removed or
otherwise suppressed 437,000 communications.8 Moreover, the fourth
quarter report announced (with apparent pride) that this number was
significantly higher than the prior quarter's corresponding number of
357,000 - a jump of more than 22% - indicating that we can expect a
continuing upward trajectory. 9
II.

THE PLATFORMS' REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH SHOULD BE BASED
ON THE SPEECH-PROTECTIVE ELEMENTS OF U.N. FREE SPEECH
STANDARDS

What is the best response to the singularly impactful and challenging
question that this Article addresses - namely, what hate speech standards
should Platforms enforce? This Article endorses the approach that has
been forcefully advocated by prominent experts 10 in both freedom of
speech and international law:" Platforms should adhere to the speech2020/#:~:text=On%20Facebook%20in%20Q4%20we,from%204%20million%20in%20Q
3.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. These experts include University of California, Irvine Law School Professor
David Kaye, who is the immediate past U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right of Freedom of Opinion and Expression (the "Special Rapporteur
on Free Speech"), having served in that role from 2014 through 2020. Mr. David Kaye,
Special Rapporteuron the promotion andprotection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression,
U.N.
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMM'R,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/
DavidKaye.aspx (last visited March 8, 2021). In 1993, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (the "Commission") mandated that the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, "make
recommendations . . . on ways . . . to better promote and protect the right to freedom of
opinion and expression," among other things. Special Procedures of the Human Rights
Council,
Special Procedures, U.N.
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMM'R,

www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
11. Important advocates of this approach also include individual scholars whose
work this Article cites, and the civil society organizations Access Now, Amnesty
International, Article 19, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l,
'Let Us Breathe!' Censorship and Criminalization of Online Expression in Viet Nam, Al

Index ASA 41/3243/2020 5, 58 (2020) (calling upon major online companies to "adopt new
content moderation and community standards policies that are explicitly and primarily
grounded in international human rights standards"); ARTICLE 19, SIDE-STEPPING RIGHTS:
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protective free speech standards under international human rights law.12
specifically, Platforms should adopt pertinent U.N. treaties and their
authoritative interpretations by the U.N. bodies and officials who are
responsible for recommending interpretations of these treaty provisions
and monitoring their implementation. 13 This Article refers to the foregoing
legal norms with terms such as "U.N. law" and "U.N. standards," neither
of which are legal terms of art, for the sake of clarity and to accurately
REGULATING SPEECH BY CONTRACT 4-5 (2018), https://www.article 19.org/resources/side-

stepping-rights-regulating-speech-by-contract ("[S]ocial media companies . . . should
ensure that their Terms of Service are ... in line with international standards on freedom
of expression.").
Other individuals and organizations have advocated that Platforms should abide by U.N.
free speech (and other U.N. human rights) law in the face of governmental measures or
requests that are inconsistent with U.N. norms but have not expressly addressed the related
question of whether Platforms should align their content moderation policies with U.N.
free speech standards. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73; GNI Principles, GLOB.
NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gni-principles/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2021).
12.
See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteuron the
Promotion andProtection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion andExpression, Hum. Rts.

Council on Its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (2018) [hereinafter 2018
Special Rapporteur on Free Speech]. In 2011, then-Special Rapporteur on Free Speech,
Frank La Rue, issued a report recognizing that, "any restriction [on] the right to freedom
of expression [on] the Internet must . . comply with international human rights law." Frank
La Rue (Special Rapporteur), Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter 2011

Special Rapporteur on Free Speech]. However, the 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free
Speech Report is the first such report that focused specifically on the responsibility of
online intermediaries, including the Platforms, to respect U.N. human rights standards in
their content moderation policies.
13. Kaye's 2018 report urging Platform compliance with "international human
rights law" defined that term as "including the relevant [U.N.] treaties and interpretations
of the treaty bodies and special procedure mandate holders and other experts, including the
Rabat Plan of Action." 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 58(b).
"Treaty bodies" include the Human Rights Committee and the Committee for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as discussed infra at note 110. "Special procedure
mandate holders" include the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech. For discussion of the
Rabat Plan of Action, see infra at text accompanying note 147; Evelyn Aswad, The Future
of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 26, 64 (2018) [hereinafter

Aswad 2018] ("Given that an international human rights court solely dedicated to
adjudicating rights [under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] does
not exist, the U.N. machinery's recommended interpretations of U.N. [free speech]
standards have come primarily from the Human Rights Committee, the Special Rapporteur,
and (occasionally) certain high-profile, non-binding consensus resolutions adopted by U.N.
member states.").
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describe and highlight the noteworthy fact that these legal norms emanate
from U.N. treaties, officials, and bodies.
The pertinent U.N. treaties, as well as the multifarious documents
through which U.N. officials and bodies interpret and implement them,
contain strong speech-protective elements that overlap with key speechprotective elements contained in U.S. law. However, the U.N.'s complex
body of material also contains elements that not only permit certain speech
restrictions, but also mandate some hate speech restrictions. Therefore, in
exhorting Platforms to align their content moderation policies with U.N.
free speech law, Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye referred in
particular to the most speech-protective elements of that law; other
proponents of this approach have done likewise.
Kaye and others forcefully argue that the overall recent trend in U.N.
free speech law is toward increased speech protection," and that more
recent speech-protective interpretations should be understood to supersede
earlier less-protective ones, as happens within U.S. free speech law."
Other experts point out that various U.N. officials and bodies continue to
issue some free speech/hate speech-related documents that are inconsistent
with the U.N.'s speech-protective materials. 16 In any event, it is critical for
free speech proponents to exert all potential influence on U.N. agencies
and officials - as well as on Platforms - to adhere to the important recent
speech-protective interpretations within the U.N. system; this is the point
of Professor Evelyn Aswad's opening epigram to this Article, and other
experts have made the same point." Because the U.N. standards are
enforced in part by "states with weaker traditions of free speech and press
and judicial independence," 18 it behooves supporters of democracy and of

14.

See infra text accompanying notes 35, 37, 103, and 105.

15.
See Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 637.
16.
See MICHAEL FARRIS & PAUL COLEMAN, HERITAGE FOUND., FIRST PRINCIPLES
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4 (2020) ("[A]t the heart of the U.N. system is a

contradictory - even schizophrenic - approach to freedom of expression, with both a
pro-free speech and pro-censorship approach in existence at the same time.").
17. See id. at 27 ("If the pro-free speech 'side' is to take precedence [within the
U.N. system], positive U.S. action is needed. Free speech must be .. . championed at the
international level.").
18.

Sarah H. Cleveland, Hate Speech at Home and Abroad, in THE FREE SPEECH

CENTURY 210, 224 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2018).
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free speech to advocate especially strong U.N. free speech protections as
a prophylactic measure.19
Recognizing the complexities and inconsistencies within the body of
U.N. free speech materials and interpretations, as well as the challenges of
formulating specific content moderation policies that are consistent with
the broad speech-protective elements of these U.N. standards, this Article
focuses on one specific aspect of the important analytical work that is
required to implement Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye's
approach. 2 Specifically, this Article aims to lay out the strongest plausible
case for Platforms to align their content moderation policies with the most
speech-protective U.N. free speech standards. Heeding the old adage that
"the devil [or the angel] is in the details," this Article seeks to highlight
the angelic details within the U.N. materials - from a free speech
perspective - and to urge free speech proponents to promote these both
in the U.N.'s ongoing work and in the Platforms' content moderation
policies.
First, this Article explains the distinction between the global U.N. free
speech regime and other bodies of free speech law that are often referred
to as "international," noting the reasons why the Platforms should adhere
specifically to the speech-protective elements of the U.N. free speech
regime. Next, this Article outlines the advantages of this approach from
the perspectives of both the Platforms' users and the Platforms themselves.
This Article then explains the substantial overlap between key speechprotective principles under recent U.S. and U.N. law, which condone
suppressing hate speech only in appropriately narrow circumstances, and
which stress non-censorial approaches for reducing hateful attitudes and

19. See id. (explaining that, during treaty negotiations regarding U.N. treaty
provisions on free speech/hate speech, the U.S. advocated for the provisions to provide
more speech-protective standards than were then reflected in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, for precisely these reasons); infra note 143.
20.

See, e.g., Susan Benesch, But Facebook's Not a Country: How to Interpret

Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies, 38 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE BULL. 86,
110 (2020). See also Justitia, Future of Free Speech Project: Realizing a Human Rights
Approach in the Era of "Platformization" (on file with author) (describing a planned report
that will provide detailed guidance about content moderation policies for hate speech and
mis- and dis-information that comply with U.N. free speech standards).
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action, including "counterspeech" 21 measures such as education and
dialogue.
As many expert U.N. officials and bodies have noted, hate speech
restrictions that exceed the narrow contours permitted under the speechprotective elements in U.N. law too often "are used [by governments] to
suppress critical or opposing voices,"2 2 and are also used, "to the detriment
of' racial and other minority groups. 23 Not surprisingly, the same problems
afflict the Platforms' hate speech policies,24 since the Platforms are now
free to design and implement these policies in any way they choose, such
as to promote their corporate self-interests and to capitulate to pressures
from governments, including authoritarian governments. 2
III. U.N. LAW IS DISTINCT FROM OTHER BODIES OF LAW THAT ARE
SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS "INTERNATIONAL": THE DOMESTIC
LAW OF OTHER COUNTRIES; AND THE LAW UNDER REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION BY REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COURTS

As noted above, this Article specifically includes the term "U.N." when
referring to its pertinent law and standards, 26 to underscore the important
distinctions between U.N. law and other law that is sometimes labeled
21. While "counterspeech" is not an official legal term of art in either U.N. or U.S.
law, it is widely used to embrace any expression that aims to "counter" or curb the ideas
reflected in any controversial speech as well as the potential adverse impact of such speech.
Advocacy of counterspeech, rather than censorship, reflects the substantiated conclusion
that the most effective response to speech with controversial content, including hate
speech, is not less speech, but more. See NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD
RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 156-82, 217-21 (2018).
22.
Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur), Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/67/357 (2012) [hereinafter 2012

Special Rapporteur on Free Speech].
23. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen. Recommendation
No. 35, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) [hereinafter Gen. Recommendation 35].
24.
See e.g., STROSSEN, supranote 21, at 91-94.
25. To cite an example that occurred shortly before this Article was completed, on
February 10, 2021, in response to demands from the Indian government, Twitter
permanently blocked over 500 accounts that criticized the government for its conduct
during farmers' protests. Karan Deep Singh, Twitter Blocks Accounts in India as Modi
Pressures
Social
Media,
N.Y.
Times
(Feb.
10,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/technology/india-twitter.html.

26.

For further explanation of the use of this terminology see supra note 2 and text

following note 14, supra.
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"international" despite its non-global scope. This section elaborates upon
those distinctions.
In my extensive experience discussing these issues with many diverse
audiences - including audiences comprising many lawyers and law
students - it is apparent that U.N. free speech law is not as well-known
as it should be, considering its embodiment in treaties to which almost
every country in the world is a party, giving it worldwide force.2 7 My
experience indicates that U.N. international human rights law tends to be
less well-known than other bodies of human rights law that are also
"international" in scope, insofar as they concern the law of other nations
and hence are sometimes referred to as "international human rights law." 2
In contrast with these other bodies of law, only the U.N. regime has
international support at the global level, transcending regional as well as
national boundaries. For example, the major U.N. treaty governing
freedom of speech is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ["ICCPR"], to which 178 countries are parties (out of the 193
countries that are U.N. members). 29 Given the Platforms' global nature,
their content moderation policies should conform to the global human
rights standards embodied in U.N. treaties and interpretive materials.
Correspondingly, especially given the variation among regional human
rights treaties and the regional human rights court rulings interpreting
27. After my presentation about this topic at the in-person Symposium that led to
this present Michigan State InternationalLaw Review Symposium, Professor Erik Bleich
asked audience members to raise their hands if they had any knowledge of U.N. human
rights treaties, and few did. Colleagues who also speak about this theme have reported
similar experiences.
28. Examples of more broadly known bodies of human rights law include the
domestic law of countries other than the U.S. and the law under regional human rights
treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by regional
human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights.
29.
See Member States, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html
(last
visited
Feb.
19,
2020);
Non-member
States,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/non-member-states/index.html (last visited

Feb. 19, 2021). The 15 U.N. member states that are not parties to ICCPR are: Bhutan; Brunei
Darussalam; Kiribati; Malaysia; Micronesia (Federated States of); Myanmar; Oman; Saint
Kitts and Nevis; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Solomon Islands; South Sudan; Tonga; Tuvalu;
and United Arab Emirates. Moreover, one non-member observer to the U.N. is a party to
ICCPR: the State of Palestine. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status
of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://indicators.ohchr.org;
Member States, U.N. https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html (last visited Mar.

15, 2021).

3 20

Michigan State International Law Review

[Vol. 29.2

them, it is inappropriate for global companies to adhere to any one body
of regional human rights law. As Professor Aswad wrote:
What basis does Twitter have for favoring (or applying) Europe's
regional approach to human rights in its global operations over other
regions' human rights instruments? It is only by citing to universal
standards embodied in international human rights law that Twitter can
claim to ground its worldwide rules in a fair manner.30

-

Those unfamiliar with U.N. free speech law are typically surprised to
learn that it now contains key elements that are highly speech-protective,
consistent with important speech-protective precepts of U.S. First
Amendment law in general, and that it also accords substantial protection
to much hate speech in particular. To be sure, as with any complex body
of law that has evolved over time and is subject to interpretation by various
individuals and bodies, certain interpretations and applications of U.N.
free speech standards are in tension, or even inconsistent, with others. 31
Likewise, despite U.S. free speech law's generally speech-protective
thrust, it too contains significant speech-suppressive elements,3 2 and even
its speech-protective aspects have only recently predominated
considering that the First Amendment was added to the Constitution in
1791 - reflecting a constant tug of war between broader and narrower
interpretations of the free speech guarantee.
Although U.N. free speech law similarly contains censorial elements,33
some leading experts concur that the predominant trend in recent U.N. law

30.
31.
32.

Aswad 2018, supra note 13, at 45.
See Farris & Coleman, supra note 16.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63

FED. COMMC'N. L.J. 579, 585 (2011) (describing multiple cases in which the Supreme
Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts, has rejected free speech claims
and created new categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection for certain
speakers, contrary to conventional wisdom that the Roberts Court has been consistently
speech-protective).
33. As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 128-54, two key U.N. treaty
provisions mandate restrictions on certain hate speech. Although important U.N. officials
and bodies have strictly interpreted these provisions as permitting hate speech restrictions
only in limited circumstances, it nonetheless remains the case that some U.N. bodies do
not clearly, consistently adhere to these strict interpretations.
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has been toward greater speech protection, including for hate speech. 34 Just
as older U.S. Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") decisions are widely
considered to have been effectively overruled by subsequent, more
speech-protective decisions - even though the older rulings never have
been officially overruled 35 - some experts maintain that older U.N.
interpretations of treaty provisions regarding free speech/hate speech
should also be considered to have been superseded by more recent speechprotective interpretations. 36 In any case, the many proponents of strong
free speech protection around the world, including many human rights and
digital rights activists and scholars, should recognize and encourage the
speech-protective elements of U.N. law - while critiquing inconsistent
elements - just as they do regarding other pertinent bodies of free speech
law, including First Amendment law. Free speech proponents should also
engage more proactively and consistently with the U.N. human rights

34.

See, e.g., Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 634, 643, 657; Cleveland, supra note

18, at 230-31; 2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 28. Some other
experts have advocated repealing or revising certain U.N. treaty provisions so that the
treaty language more clearly restrains government power to restrict hate speech. Amal
Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in InternationalLaw, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 1, 53 (2017) (advocating that U.N. treaty language should "prohibit speech only
where it intentionally incites violence or a criminal offence that is likely to follow
imminently ... as a result of the speech"). See also Farris & Coleman, supra note 16. For
a persuasive rejoinder to the Clooney and Webb piece, see Aswad 2020, supra note 2, in
which Aswad endorses Clooney and Webb's goal of securely embedding strong speechprotective standards in U.N. law, but argues that the most effective strategy for doing so
is to promote the recent speech-protective trend in U.N. officials' and agencies'
interpretations of those treaty provisions.
35. For example, even though the Supreme Court has never overturned its decision
in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), in which the Court declined to strike down
a state law regulating racist speech, that decision is generally considered to be inconsistent
with subsequent Court rulings, including N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 695, 1402 (Rachel
E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2019). Likewise, although the Court has never overturned
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which it upheld a "fighting words"
conviction, that decision is generally considered to have been largely eviscerated by
multiple subsequent Supreme Court rulings, including United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010). See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 1387. As yet another example, the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is very much in
tension with multiple earlier decisions that have not been overturned. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra, at 1375-76.
36.
See Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 637-43.
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machinery on free expression issues rather than solely or primarily
reacting to U.N. actions and interpretations after the fact. 37
Important aspects of U.N. law that strongly protect free speech in
general, and hate speech in particular, distinguish it from other bodies of
law that are sometimes referred to as "international," such as the domestic
law of other countries and regional human rights law. Those other bodies
of law are in significant respects less speech-protective than both First
Amendment and U.N. free speech law. 38 This is one reason that Kaye and
other experts have recommended that the Platforms align their content
moderation policies specifically with the speech-protective aspects of
U.N. free speech law, noting that it is not sufficient for the Platforms
instead to model such policies on less speech-protective regional or
national free speech law. 39 As noted above, these experts have also
37.

See id. at 655-56; Evelyn Douek, UN. Special Rapporteur'sLatest Report on

-

Online Content Regulation Callsfor 'HumanRights by Default', LAWFARE (June 6, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-special-rapporteurs-latest-report-onlinecontent-regulation-calls-human-rights-default ("[J]ust as the vaguely worded First
Amendment has crystallized into more concrete rules, so too can international law.
Compared with the First Amendment, international law on freedom of expression is young,
having come into existence only since World War II, and active engagement with these
norms . . could facilitate its ongoing development.").
38. For an extensive discussion of the multiple respects in which U.N. law more
strongly protects free speech than does regional human rights law, see Aswad 2018, supra
note 13, at 45. For example, U.N. and U.S. law protects the following kinds of controversial
speech that European law does not protect: blasphemy and the denial of certain historic
atrocities. Id. A significant general respect in which European law is less speech-protective
than U.N. and U.S. free speech law is the European law's deference to government.
Specifically, the European Court of Human Rights invokes a "margin of appreciation,"
which constitutes a thumb on the scale in favor of government interests when balancing
them against free speech rights. Id. In contrast, under U.N. and U.S. free speech law, the
thumb is on the opposite side of the scale; speech restrictions are presumed impermissible,
and the government has the burden of overcoming that presumption by demonstrating
among other things - that the restriction is necessary and the least restrictive alternative
to promote the government's countervailing important public purpose. See infra at text
accompanying notes 87 and 115.
39. See 2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 26 (noting that
the European Court of Human Rights has been less speech-protective, in notable respects,
than U.N. free speech law, and concluding that "[r]egional human rights norms cannot . .
be invoked to justify departure from international human rights protections"); accord,
Aswad 2020, supranote 2, at 636-37 (referring to Germany's strict Internet regulation law,

the "NetzDG," as violating U.N. free speech standards, and rejecting Germany's reliance
on the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence in defending that law on grounds

2021]

UnitedNations FreeSpeech Standardsas the GlobalBenchmark 323

stressed, as an added rationale for this recommendation, that only global
standards - not regional standards - can fairly be enforced at a global
level."
Indeed, some human rights advocates maintain that companies should
also resist complying with local laws that violate U.N. free speech
standards, and some Platforms have pledged to do so." For example,
Amnesty International endorsed and applied that approach to Facebook
and Google, given their especially enormous size and power, in a report
that it issued on November 30, 2020; in that same report, Amnesty
International
also noted the applicability of this approach to
communications/technology companies generally:
According to international human rights standards, Facebook and
Google should respect freedom of expression in their content moderation
decisions globally, regardless of the existence of local laws that muzzle
freedom of expression. While companies sometimes point to the
difficulties posed by conflicting obligations under local and international
legal standards, they should be guided by the U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, which state: "The responsibility to respect
human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business
enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of States'
abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights obligations
.... And it exists over and above compliance with national laws and
regulations protecting human rights." 2

that, "invocation of a regionaltreaty cannot justify a country's violation of its international

treaty obligations").
40.

See supraat text accompanying note 31.

41. See text accompanying notes 71-73 infra, which discuss the Global Network
Initiative, whose "[p]articipating companies will ... work to protect the freedom of
expression rights of users when confronted with government demands [and] laws . . . to
suppress freedom of expression . . . in a manner inconsistent with internationally
recognized laws and standards."
42.

See Amnesty Int'l, supranote 11, at 6 (quoting Commentary to Principle 11 of

the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)).
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IV. ADVANTAGES TO THE PLATFORMS AND TO THEIR USERS OF THE
PLATFORMS' ADHERING TO SPEECH-PROTECTIVE U.N. FREE SPEECH
STANDARDS

1.

The Platforms now exercise vast censorial power,
unconstrained by the limits on government

.

In a 2017 decision, the Supreme Court declared, "[w]hile in the past
there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places .
. for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace . .
and social media in particular."4 3 The Platforms are the most essential
forums for debate and discussion about public affairs and public officials
among "We the People," 4 4 and for us to engage with public officials and
candidates for public office. These facts make it vital for our democracy
to maintain the same "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"" free speech in
these new virtual venues that the Court has historically protected in
traditional venues, proclaiming: "Speech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."4 6 Yet, the First
Amendment free speech guarantee, far from restraining the Platforms'
speech-restricting policies,4 7 actuallyprotects any such policies as an exercise
of the Platforms' own free speech rights.4 8
In terms of the current factual and legal realities, we now face the worst
of both worlds when it comes to the Platforms' censorial power over
everyone else's speech: on the one hand, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged, the Platforms wield censorial power of a magnitude that in

43. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
44. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
45. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
46. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
47. As private sector entities, the Platforms are not constrained by the First
Amendment, which generally binds only government actors except in a few, limited
circumstances. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35. Various scholars and litigators

have argued that Platforms' content moderation policies should be viewed as constituting
state action subject to U.S. constitutional constraints, on a range of theories. To date, of
the many courts that have considered such arguments, none has accepted any of them. See,
e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020).
48. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(upholding a newspaper's First Amendment right to decide what not to publish as well as
what to publish).
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the past only governments have exercised; 4 9 on the other hand, the First
Amendment imposes no constraint on that non-governmental power. Not
surprisingly, therefore, we have witnessed an outpouring of complaints
from across the political and ideological spectrums that the Platforms are
wielding their speech-suppressive power to silence or mute important
messages of all stripes. Donald Trump and other conservatives complain
that the Platforms' content moderation decisions reflect an anticonservative bias. 5 Conversely, Democratic officials complain that, in
response to those allegations, the Platforms bend over backward to avoid
suppressing conservative messages that many Democrats and progressives
maintain should be suppressed on various grounds, including that they
constitute disinformation or hate speech.51 Social justice activists,
members of racial and other minority groups, and right-leaning individuals
and groups alike are united in complaining that their messages are
disproportionately silenced.52 Not a day goes by without media reports of
claims that the Platforms have inappropriately silenced - or failed to

49. See Richard Ashby Wilson & Molly Land, Hate Speech on Social Media:
Towards a Context-Specific Content Moderation Policy, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2020)
(footnotes omitted):
Governments are no longer the primary regulators of speech. Their regulatory capacity has
been far outstripped by some of the largest companies in the world..., which together
regulate the speech of 3.7 billion active social media users... In a reversal of the historic
roles, private corporations have at times become the de facto regulators of government
speech, as when Facebook banned the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar's military from
the platform and removed over 400 other news, entertainment, and lifestyle pages linked
to the military.
Even more dramatically, in January 2021, Facebook and other Platforms banned the
Commander-in-Chief of the US. Billy Perrigo, Facebook and Twitter Finally Locked
Donald Trump's Accounts. Will They Ban Him Permanently?, TIME (Jan. 7, 2021)
https://time.com/59273 98/facebook-twitter-trump-suspension-capitol/.
50. Shannon Bond, Trump Accuses Social Media ofAnti-Conservative Bias After
Twitter
Marks
His
Tweets,
NPR
(May
27,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/863422722/trmp-accuses-social-media-of-anti-

conservative-bias-after-twitter-marks-his-twe.
51.

Rachel Kraus, Once Again, There Is No Anti-Conservative' Bias on Social

Media, MASHABLE (July 28, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/anti-conservative-biasfacebook/.
52. Rachel Elizabeth Cargle, When White People Are Uncomfortable, Black
People

Are

Silenced,

HARPER'S

BAZAAR

(Jan.

9,

https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a25747603/silencing-black-voices/.
also Bond, supra note 50.

2019),

See
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-

silence - significant messages about COVID-19, national and local
elections, or other topics of public concern.53
The Platforms' unprecedented censorial power is especially
problematic because their suppression decisions are not accompanied by
the procedural protections that cabin government censorship, along with
First Amendment constraints. For example, while Facebook
commendably - has chosen to permit some appeals from its decisions
that bar speech or speakers, commentators have observed that Facebook
nonetheless appears relatively immune to arguments about posts that it had
removed under its hate speech policies." A recent Facebook report showed
that its takedowns of hate speech are among the most appealed."" This is
not surprising given the inherent subjectivity in determining what
constitutes hate speech. Yet these posts are also "the least likely to be
restored." 6 For the period of October 2017 to March 2019, Facebook
reported that it had considered 1.1 million appeals from hate speech
takedowns but reversed itself in only 152,000 such cases. 57 In other words,
in just eighteen months, nearly 1 million users proactively 58
but
unsuccessfully contended that their posts were unjustifiably suppressed as
hate speech by just one company.
In the third quarter of 2020, Facebook reported that it had restored
fewer than 250,000 posts out of the more than 22 million that it had
reportedly removed as prohibited hate speech, slightly more than one
percent. 59 Facebook also reported that, due to the coronavirus, it relied
mostly on automated takedown methods and did not permit users to appeal

53.

See, e.g., RECLAIM THE NET, https://reclaimthenet.org/ (last visited Feb. 19,

2021); Gennie Gebhart, Who Has Your Back? CensorshipEdition 2019, ELEC.

FRONTIER

FOUND. (June 12, 2019), https://www.eff.org/de/wp/who-has-your-back-2019.

54.
Through

See, e.g., Komali, Comment to The Efficacy of Reddit's 2015 Ban Examined
Hate
Speech,
HACKER
NEWS
(Sept.
11,
2017),

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15220305.
55. Jonathan Shieber, Facebook Releases Community Standards Enforcement
Report, TECHCRUNCH (May 23, 2019), https://techcmnch.com/2019/05/23/facebook-

releases-community-standards-enforcement-report/.
56. Id.
57. Guy Rosen, An Update on How We Are Doing at Enforcing Our Community
Standards, FACEBOOK (May 23, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/05/enforcing-ourcommunity-standards-3.

58. One can fairly assume that additional users believed that their posts were also
unjustifiably suppressed as hate speech but did not undertake the effort to appeal.
59. Shieber, supra note 55; Rosen, supra note 57.
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in most situations. 60 This practice substantially increased the number of
users maintaining that their posts were wrongly taken down on hate speech
grounds without recourse.61 Automated takedown inevitably leads to more
unjustified suppression under such an inherently context-dependent
concept as hate speech. 62
As powerful and influential as the Platforms are in the U.S., with the
nation's relatively developed and diverse communications and
information ecosystem, these Platforms wield even more power and
influence in less developed countries, whose inhabitants have fewer means
through which they can communicate and access information. For
example, in some countries, Facebook effectively is the Internet for the
many people who are dependent on mobile phone applications and for
whom Facebook is the only accessible app. 63
2. Almost all countries are parties to the U.N. treaties governing
free speech and hate speech
-

In light of the extensive - and in some countries nearly exclusive
control that the Platforms wield over communications and information, if
individuals are going to exercise meaningful freedom to convey and
receive information and ideas, that freedom must be protected on the

60.

Transparency,

Hate

Speech,

FACEBOOK

(February

2021),

https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement#hate-speech
("NOTE: Due to a temporary reduction in our review capacity as a result of COVID-19,
we could not always offer our users the option to appeal. We still gave people the option
to tell us they disagreed with our decision, which helped us review many of these instances
and restore content when appropriate.").
61. Id.
62.

See Svea Windwehr & Jillian C. York, Facebook'sMost Recent Transparency

Report DemonstratesPitfalls ofAutomated ContentModeration,ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Oct.
8,
2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/10/facebooks-most-recenttransparency-report-demonstrates-pitfalls-automated-content:
Automated systems are simply not capable of consistently identifying content correctly.
Human communication and interactions are complex, and automated tools misunderstand
the political, social or interpersonal context of speech all the time. That is why it is crucial
that algorithmic content moderation is supervised by human moderators and that users can
contest takedowns.
63. Nick Farrell, Developing Countries Think FacebookIs the Internet, FUDZILLA
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.fudzilla.com/news/36984-developing-countries-thinkfacebook-is-the-internet.
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Platforms. Notwithstanding the different legal systems and standards
among the world's countries, almost all of them have become parties to
the two U.N. treaties that directly govern free speech in general and hate
speech in particular: the ICCPR and the International Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ["ICERD"],
respectively.64 As observed by Susan Benesch, executive director of the
Dangerous Speech Project, "[n]o [other] source of rules for speech
regulation is as widely known or formally adopted." 65 From the
perspective of individuals worldwide, it would be advantageous for the
Platforms - as well as government parties - to honor these U.N. treaties
because they embody universal human rights, including free speech rights,
regardless of one's identity, beliefs, or location.
As the next section of this Article details, the Platforms' adoption of
and compliance with the speech-protective elements of U.N. free speech
law not only would entail several principled advantages, but also would
have strategic advantages from the perspectives of users, democratic
governments, and the Platforms themselves. Additionally, such a move
would have strategic advantages from the perspective of U.S. users in
particular, as a more feasible and effective option than the Platforms'
potential adherence to U.S. free speech standards.

64.

Out of the 193 nations that are U.N. members, 183 are parties to ICERD, and

178

are parties to ICCPR. See Member States, supra note 31; InternationalConvention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV2&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 10, 2021); InternationalCovenant on Civil and
Political
Rights,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,

https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). The ten U.N. member states that
are not parties to ICERD are: Brunei Darussalam; Democratic People's Republic
of Korea; Kiribati; Malaysia; Micronesia (Federated States of); Myanmar; Samoa;
South Sudan; Tuvalu; Vanuatu. Moreover, two non-member observers to the UN
are parties to ICERD: the Holy See and the State of Palestine. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratification Interactive
Dashboard,U.N. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://indicators.ohchr.org; Member States,
U.N. https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2021). The 15 member states that are not parties to ICCPR are listed in note 30
supra.
65. Benesch, supra note 20, at 89.
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3.

Strategic advantages of Platforms' adherence to speechprotective elements of U.N. free speech law

Adherence to a single set of standards would relieve or at least reduce
the Platforms' burdens of attempting to comply with multiple different
legal standards in different jurisdictions. Adherence to the speechprotective aspects of U.N. free speech standards would make it easier for
Platforms to resist pressures from individual governments to restrict
speech in ways that violate these standards. 66 After all, it bears repeating,
almost every single country in the world is a party to the ICCPR and the
ICERD. Therefore, by moderating content in accordance with those U.N.
treaties - and in accordance with their speech-protective interpretations 67
- rather than in accordance with any inconsistent standards under any one
country's laws, Platforms would be honoring each country's own
international legal obligations. This point was forcefully made in the
above-quoted November 2020 Amnesty International report. It strongly
critiqued Facebook and Google for capitulating to the Vietnamese
government's pressure to suppress speech that criticized its policies and
advocated democratic reforms, in violation of U.N. free speech standards:
Technology companies including Facebook and Google must urgently
overhaul their content moderation policies to ensure that they are firmly
grounded in international human rights standards ... The reformulation
of these policies will provide the companies with firm ground to stand
on as they seek to resist the repressive censorship demands of the
Vietnamese authorities and other governments around the world. 68

Some Platforms have professed support for honoring U.N. free speech
norms concerning content moderation, rather than any inconsistent
domestic or regional law, in the face of government demands - even
66.
See Molly Land, Toward an InternationalLaw of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 393, 447, 452 (2013):
[T]echnology companies may welcome the normative guidance Article 19 offers.
Technology companies today are constantly engaged in questions about how to balance
their own terms of service, local law, commercial demands, corporate culture, and at times
even their own sense of morality . . . Article 19 could also provide important political
"cover" in negotiating the demands of local law.

67.

See infra text accompanying notes 95-164.

68.

Amnesty Int'l, supra note 11, at 8.
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though they continue to flout such norms in practice, as illustrated by the
just-discussed actions of Facebook and Google at the behest of the
Vietnamese government. 69 Platforms must be pressed to go beyond mere
lip service to U.N. free speech norms; rather, Platforms should consistently
honor the U.N.'s strongest speech-protective norms.
One initiative that has sought to secure Platforms' compliance with
speech-protective U.N. standards is the Global Network Initiative (GNI).
The GNI was launched in 2008 to promote "internationally recognized
rights to freedom of expression and privacy" as "enshrined in instruments
such as the [ICCPR] and the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights."? Facebook, Google, and other Platforms are members of
the GNI, since they "agreed that" U.N. human rights standards constitute
"the foundation for good law and policy." 1 Concerning freedom of
expression, the GNI Principles state in part:
Participating companies will respect and work to protect the freedom of
expression of their users by seeking to avoid or minimize the impact of
government restrictions on freedom of expression ...
Participating companies will respect and work to protect the freedom of
expression rights of users when confronted with government demands,
laws and regulations to suppress freedom of expression . .. in a manner
inconsistent with internationally recognized laws and standards ...
When faced with a government restriction or demand that appears ...
inconsistent with . .. international human rights laws and standards on
freedom of expression . . . participating companies will in appropriate
cases ... seek ... modification from authorized officials of such requests;
[s]eek the assistance, as needed, of... international human rights bodies

69. Id at 6; Benesch, supra note 20, at 99 (referring to Facebook's self-proclaimed
international human rights standards as part of its commitment to a "holistic and
comprehensive" content moderation process, Benesch observes that, "[w]hile this public
commitment is somewhat reassuring, accounting for human-rights standards as part of a
holistic evaluation is very different than placing them at the core of your decision-making
process").
70. About
GNI,
GLOB.
NETWORK
INITIATIVE,
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/about-gni/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
71.

Id;

Our

Members,

GLOB.

NETWORK

https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/#home-menu (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).

INITIATIVE,
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or non-governmental organizations; and [c]hallenge the government in
domestic courts.72

As another indication of some Platform support for the notion that
content moderation policies should respect U.N. free speech norms,
Facebook's quasi-independent Oversight Board, launched in 2020, has
professed fidelity to such norms in exercising its authority to make final
decisions regarding certain content moderation issues, stating: "[t]he
Board will review whether content is consistent with .. . a commitment to
upholding freedom of expression within the framework of international
norms of human rights." 3 Indeed, the Board's first six decisions -- which
it issued in January and February, 2021 - all cited the key U.N. treaty
provision that protects free speech - Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - and five of those six
decisions reversed Facebook's removal of the speech at issue on the
ground that the removal violated Article 19."
Given liberal democratic countries' commitments to individual liberty,
equality, and democracy, they should prefer content moderation standards
that would facilitate the Platforms' resistance of censorial pressures from
authoritarian governments. Indeed, as noted above, it behooves liberal
democracies to promote, and to encourage Platforms to respect, the most
speech-protective aspects of U.N. free speech principles precisely because
these "principles would often be applied in states with weaker traditions
of free speech and press and judicial independence." 5 Conversely, recent
evidence shows that when liberal democracies have instead required or
pressured Platforms to restrict speech that should be protected under U.N.
standards, these speech-suppressive measures are later copied by
authoritarian countries with severe adverse impacts on their citizens' free
speech rights, equality, and democracy. The Danish-based human rights
organization, Justitia, has issued two reports documenting the negative

72.
GNI Principles,supra note 11; Implementation Guidelines, GLOB. NETWORK
INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementation-guidelines/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2021).
73.

Announcing First Members of Oversight Board, OVERSIGHT BD. (May 6,

2020), www.oversightboard.com/news/announcing-the-first-members-of-the-oversightboard/.
74.

See Board Decisions, OVERSIGHT BD., https://oversightboard.com/decision/

(last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
75. Cleveland, supra note 18, at 224.
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impact that Germany's "NetzDG" 6 law has had in many countries around
the world since being implemented in 2018."? Presumably, German
officials who supported this law did not to intend for authoritarian regimes
to copy it, but they should have anticipated this predictable result. As
Justitia's 2020 report concluded:
While it would be misleading to blame Germany for the draconian laws
adopted in authoritarian states, the fact that the spread of illiberal norms
based on the NetzDG precedent has continued unabated should give
Germany, liberal democracies and the European Commission food for
thought when it comes to countering illegal and undesirable online
content ...
In a world where both online and offline speech is under systematic
global attack, democracies have a special obligation to err on the side of
free speech, rather than succumbing to the ever-present temptation of
fighting illiberal ideas with illiberal laws. Once democracies cede the
high ground, authoritarians will rush in, creating a regulatory race to the
bottom. This entails severe and negative consequences for free speech,
independent media, vibrant civil society and political pluralism, without
which authoritarianism cannot be defeated, nor democracy protected. 78

Even from the perspective of Platform users in the U.S., with its strong
constitutional protection of free speech against government regulation, it
would be strategically advantageous for the Platforms to model their
content moderation policies on U.N. free speech law. U.S. users who prize
freedom of speech presumably would welcome the positive impact that
this approach would have on free speech worldwide. In contrast, if the
Platforms modeled their policies on U.S. free speech law, then other
countries would likely resist the enforcement within their borders of a free
76.

This is an abbreviation of the term "Netzwerkdurchsetzunggesetz," which is

commonly translated as the "Network Enforcement Act." NetzDG Notifizierung,
FRAGDENSTAAT, https://fragdenstaat.de/anfrage/netzdg-notifizierung/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2021).
77.
JACOB MCHANGAMA & JOELLE FISS, JUSTITIA, THE DIGITAL BERLIN WALL:
How GERMANY (ACCIDENTALLY) CREATED A PROTOTYPE FOR GLOBAL ONLINE CENSORSHIP
6-16 (2019) [hereinafter JUSTITIA 2019]; JACOB MCHANGAMA & NATALIE ALKIVIADOU,
JUSTITIA, THE DIGITAL BERLIN WALL: How GERMANY (ACCIDENTALLY) CREATED A
PROTOTYPE FOR GLOBAL ONLINE CENSORSHIP - ACT TwO 9-20 (2020) [hereinafter JUSTITIA

2020].
78.

JUSTITIA 2020,

supra note 77 at 3, 21.
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speech regime that is generally perceived as "exceptionalist" in its strong
speech protection. Specifically, many other countries would likely
continue to require or pressure the Platforms to suppress much speech that
the First Amendment would protect. For this same reason, the Platforms,
with their global clientele, could not reasonably be expected to choose to
base their content moderation policies on U.S. free speech law. Indeed,
even within the U.S., many users and advertisers would be less likely to
avail themselves of Platforms that permitted the full range of controversial
speech that the First Amendment protects. Therefore, consistent with
legitimate business concerns, the Platforms have imposed many speech
restrictions that U.S. law bars government from imposing.
Notwithstanding widespread assumptions about the exceptionally
speech-protective nature of U.S. free speech law, careful comparison of
the U.N. approach to that of the U.S. demonstrates that the two share more
key elements than has generally been recognized. It should also be recalled
that the Platforms are under no obligation to respect users' free speech
rights, and do not now do so. Therefore, if the Platforms abided by the
U.N.'s speech-protective norms, this would markedly improve the
situation of U.S. users, to whom the Platforms now have no free speech
duties.79
V. IMPORTANT SPEECH-PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF U.N. LAW
DOVETAIL WITH MAJOR U.S. FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
"[T]he [U.S.'s] protection of freedom of speech has fundamentally
informed the shape of international human rights treaty protections,
including in the context of hate speech. It continues to exert a
constraining influence on treaty interpretation and jurisprudence."
- Sarah Cleveland, former member, U.N. Human Rights Committee,
20141-8 (2018)80

Conventional wisdom paints First Amendment free speech principles
concerning hate speech as extraordinarily speech-protective, and thus
79. See Aswad 2018, supra note 13, at 59-60 ("[A] rigorous and good faith
interpretation of ICCPR Article 19's tripartite test [for any valid speech restriction] would
bring company speech codes much closer to First Amendment standards than what is
currently happening with the curation of speech on platforms.").
80.

Cleveland, supra note 18, at 230-31.

3 34

Michigan State International Law Review

[Vol. 29.2

starkly distinguishable from corresponding internationally accepted free
speech principles. This conventional wisdom is, in fact, wrong for two
reasons: first, it overstates how speech-protective U.S. law is; and second,
it understates how speech-protective U.N. free speech law is. Immediately
below is a summary of these two flaws in the conventional wisdom, which
the following sections then discuss in detail.
While U.S. law does bar government from restricting hate speech solely
because of its hateful message, U.S. law permits government to restrict
such speech in particular contexts when the speech directly causes, or
threatens to cause, certain serious imminent harms. In other words, the
U.S. government may enforce any speech restriction that is necessary to
avert those harms. For example, if a hateful message, in a particular
context, intentionally causes or threatens to cause imminent
discriminatory or violent conduct, then it can be punished. Likewise, U.N.
free speech law bars any hate speech restriction unless it is necessary to
avert certain serious harms - most importantly, discriminatory or violent
conduct. Moreover, under both U.S. and U.N. free speech law, the speech
restriction must be "the least restrictive alternative."81 If the harm could be
averted through an alternative measure that is less speech-restrictive, then
that alternative measure must be employed. In sum, under both U.S. and
U.N. law, speech may be restricted only if, in a particular context, it causes
or threatens a specific harm that can be averted only through the restriction
at issue. Finally, under both U.S. and U.N. free speech law, any speech
restriction must be written in "narrowly tailored" language, with sufficient
clarity and precision to guide both individuals who are subject to it and
officials who enforce it, to avoid deterring or punishing lawful speech.
To further demonstrate the significant convergences between U.S. and
U.N. law concerning hate speech, this Article will first summarize the key
speech-protective principles of U.S. First Amendment law, and then
explain how they overlap with key U.N. speech-protective principles.
1.

Key speech-protective First Amendment principles

First Amendment law consists of a complex body of principles and
standards that the Supreme Court has forged in hundreds of cases over
81. Sometimes slightly different words are used to convey this concept: "less"
instead of "least"; "intrusive" instead of "restrictive"; and "means" instead of
"alternatives."
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more than a century. Nonetheless, the current speech-protective nature of
this law, which strictly limits government power to regulate controversial
speech, such as hate speech, largely follows from three cardinal general 2
principles. Two of these general principles impose substantive limits on
government power, and one constrains how government formulates any
speech regulation. Each principle has been endorsed by every Supreme
Court Justice in modern U.S. history, and two of the three principles are
closely paralleled in U.N. free speech law. These principles, on which this
Article elaborates below, are often summarized with the following
shorthand labels: (1) the viewpoint (or content) neutrality requirement; (2)
the emergency test or judicial strict scrutiny; and (3) the narrow tailoring
requirement.
A.

The viewpoint (or content) neutrality requirement

-

In a landmark 1989 decision, the Supreme Court hailed the viewpoint
neutrality principle as "the bedrock" sustaining the complex edifice of
modern, speech-protective First Amendment law. 83 Sometimes referred to
as "content neutrality," this principle bars government from restricting
speech solely due to the disfavored nature of its viewpoint or content
i.e., its message or idea. No matter how deeply loathed a viewpoint might
be by no matter how significant a portion of the public, this does not justify
censoring it. Accordingly, even horrifically hateful expression, which is
deeply detested by the overwhelming majority of the community, may not
be suppressed solely on that ground.84
B.

The emergency test judicial strictscrutiny

The second cardinal principle in U.S. free speech law, which is
sometimes called the "emergency" test, permits government to suppress
speech for reasons that go beyond its content or viewpoint, by permitting
the government to consider the overall context in which it is spoken. If, in
particular facts and circumstances, speech directly causes or threatens
certain imminent serious harm and the harm cannot be averted in any other
82. The adjective "general" signals that, as with any complex body of law, even
fundamental principles are subject to exception. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text.

83.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

84.

See STROSSEN, supra note 21, at xxiv-xxv.
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way, then government may restrict the speech. In short, government may
restrict the speech if the restriction is necessary to prevent an emergency
because no alternative measure, which is less speech-restrictive, will
suffice.85
The specific criteria in the First Amendment emergency test can also
be enforced through another, more general, test that courts regularly apply
when reviewing restrictions on "fundamental" rights, including freedom
of speech. Under this "strict scrutiny" test, a reviewing court closely
examines the rights-restricting measure and the government's asserted
justifications for it. The restrictive measure is presumed unconstitutional,
and government can overcome that presumption only by demonstrating
that the measure is necessary to promote a goal of compelling importance,
and the least restrictive means for doing so. 86
Despite their different rubrics, both the emergency test and strict
scrutiny entail the same essential elements. Under both, the restricted
speech must be tightly and directly connected to some specific serious
harm, such that the restriction is necessary and the least restrictive means
to avert that harm. These tests are appropriately demanding, channeling
the government's censorship power toward the particular speech that is
most likely to cause serious harm. In contrast, these tests foreclose the
government's censorship power that is most likely to cause serious harm;
when government has discretion to restrict speech that lacks a tight and
direct connection to a specific serious danger, that discretion can - and
inevitably will - be used in an arbitrary or even discriminatory manner
and as a pretext for targeting disfavored viewpoints or disempowered,
marginalized speakers. 87

85.

Id. at xx-xxi.

86. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 588-89. Sometimes the least restrictive means
test is described as requiring "narrow tailoring." Id. at 589. In this context, that term
underscores that the government measure must be carefully designed to address the specific
emergency and must not grant the government substantively broader authority beyond what
is necessary to do so. Id. This use of the phrase "narrow tailoring" is distinct from its use
to prescribe how the speech regulation must be formulated. See infra note 93.
87. See STROSSEN, supra note 21, at 81-94.
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C. Examples of hate speech that may be restricted,
consistentwith the emergency strictscrutiny
requirements
Appropriately demanding as the emergency and strict scrutiny tests are,
government can nonetheless satisfy them in multiple situations. The
Supreme Court has laid out context-specific criteria for several categories
of speech that government may restrict consistent with the emergency and
strict scrutiny tests. 88 One such category is a "true threat."89 The adjective
"true" distinguishes the legal concept of a punishable threat from a broader
category of expression to which we tend to apply the term "threat" in
ordinary speech. In everyday parlance, people often use the term "threat"
to refer to any expression that they find frightening or discomforting. In
contrast, to be a punishable true threat, the speaker must direct the
expression to a single individual or small group of individuals, and intend
to instill a "reasonable" fear on the part of any such individual that s/he
will be subject to harm. The "reasonable" fear requirement embodies an
objective standard, not a subjective one. Therefore, the fact that the
expression might frighten a particular individual, who is unusually
sensitive, does not warrant treating it as a punishable true threat. Other
examples of categories of speech that satisfy the emergency/strict scrutiny
tests include intentional incitement of imminent violence that is likely to
happen imminently 90 and targeted harassment or bullying.91
Under U.S. free speech law, hate speech may be, and has been,
punished when it satisfies the foregoing specific, contextual standards for
speech that may be restricted consistent with the general emergency and
strict scrutiny tests. Thus, contrary to common misconceptions, U.S. free
speech law does not accord absolute protection to all hate speech. Rather,
U.S. free speech law draws a sensible line between protected and
punishable hate speech - a line that is paralleled by speech-protective
U.N. free speech norms, as explained below.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id at 59-66.
Id at 60-62.
Id at 62-63.
Id at 64-65.
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D. The narrow tailoring requirement for formulatingspeech
restrictions, to avoid undue vagueness
The last of the three cardinal First Amendment principles that strictly
limit government power to regulate controversial speech, including hate
speech, is the requirement that any speech regulation must be "narrowly
tailored" in how it is formulated, 92 using sufficiently clear and precise
language. This principle is also reflected in U.N. free speech law.
Recognizing that no language is perfectly precise, and hence that all
laws inevitably entail some vagueness, the narrow tailoring requirement
bars only laws that are "unduly vague." Laws will be deemed to satisfy the
narrow tailoring requirement if they provide sufficient notice to the
average person as to what conduct or expression is prohibited, and
likewise provide sufficient constraints on enforcing authorities' discretion.
When confronted with an unduly vague speech restriction, people will
engage in unwarranted self-censorship, even of speech that is lawful and
constitutionally protected, to avoid possibly violating the restriction.
Correspondingly, laws that are unduly vague vest enforcing officials with
excessive discretion that they will predictably exercise in accordance with
their own subjective values, or those of powerful community factions. At
best, officials will enforce such laws in an unpredictable, arbitrary and
capricious manner; at worst, officials will enforce such laws in a
discriminatory manner, selectively suppressing disfavored viewpoints and
speakers, and thus violating the "bedrock" viewpoint neutrality principle.93

92. As noted supra note 87, the phrase "narrowly tailored" is also sometimes used
as a synonym for the least restrictive alternative test: the substantive requirement that any
speech restriction must be necessary to advance the government's purpose and less speechrestrictive than other available measures for doing so. See STROSSEN, supra note 21, at xxxxi.
93.
See STROSSEN, supra note 21, at 69-71; see also supra note 83 (regarding
Supreme Court's reference to the "bedrock" nature of this principle).
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2.

Key speech-protective U.N. free speech principles
A.

Overview of the threepertinent U.N. treaty provisions
and their interrelationship

The U.N. free speech law provision that is the counterpart to the First
Amendment's free speech clause is ICCPR94 Article 19. Subsections (1)
and (2) of Article 19 lay out the general scope of free speech protection,
while subsection (3) sets forth the general requirements for permissible
speech restrictions. 95 Article 19(3)'s general requirements for permissible
speech restrictions have been determined to constrain hate speech
regulations in particular. 96 Both ICCPR Article 20(2) and ICERD Article
4 mandate certain restrictions on some hate speech. 97 Both restrictions

94. For the reader's convenience, this is a reminder that ICCPR and ICERD are
abbreviations for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
respectively.
95. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 19(1)-(2) [hereinafterICCPR].
96. Id art. 19(3).
97. Id art. 20(2); G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. IV (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter
ICERD]. The U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted in 1948, also requires parties to "punish" a narrowly defined category
of hate speech, namely, "direct and public incitement to commit genocide." G.A. Res. 260
A (III), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. III(a)
(Dec. 9, 1948). Notably, the Soviet Union had actively promoted adding a provision to the
Genocide Convention that would have required punishment of a much broader, vaguer
category of hate speech: "public propaganda tending by its systematic and hateful character
to provoke genocide," or "to make [genocide] appear as a necessary, legitimate or
excusable act." See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 216.
For a detailed discussion of incitement to genocide, see RICHARD ASHBY WILSON,

passim (Cambridge
University Press 2017). As Wilson explains, the pertinent "speech acts" sufficient to
constitute incitement to genocide are "generally far removed from the typical instances of
threatening or denigrating speech found in national criminal courts." Id. Underscoring the
narrowness of such "international speech crimes," he explains that:
INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES

Speakers charged with [such] crimes have generally articulated the most extreme
animus and conscious intent to harm, and gone beyond . . insult . . and slander
to incite others to commit mass atrocities. Moreover, their utterances usually

340

Michigan State International Law Review

[Vol. 29.2

were strongly opposed by the U.S. and other Western democracies, but
supported by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist
bloc nations, along with the global South. 98
The ICERD was adopted in 1965, and the ICCPR in 1966. Especially
during their earlier years, there was serious debate about the
interrelationship among their three key provisions as applied to hate
speech: ICCPR 19(3) and 20(2), and ICERD 4.99 In more recent years,
though, the U.N. bodies and officials charged with recommending
interpretations of these provisions, and with monitoring their
implementation," have repeatedly emphasized that any speech restriction
- including any hate speech restriction - must comply with ICCPR
19(3)'s strict requirements; this is true specifically for any hate speech
restrictions that ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4 mandate. 10 1 In short, these
important interpretive reports have insisted that the less speech-protective
language of ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4 must be read in conjunction with
occur in a context of an armed conflict, genocide and a widespread or systematic
attack on a civil population.
Id. at 2.

In addition to the extremely narrow contours of this punishable category of hate speech, it
is further limited by the requirements of ICCPR Article 19(3), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 106-27. See 2011 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12
¶¶ 37, 81; accord2012 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 22, ¶ 41.
98. Jacob Mchangama, The Sordid Origin of Hate-Speech Laws, 170 HooVER
INST. PoL'Y REV. 45, 53 (2011) ("Clearly, most contemporary proponents of hate-speech
laws do not share the same ideologies and methods as the communist states of the day. Yet
they seldom mention or reflect upon the fact that such laws were proposed and advocated
for by antidemocratic states in which freedom of expression (as well as all other basic
human rights) was routinely violated. Nor do they mention that these states, often
totalitarian, had a clear interest in legitimizing and justifying their repression with the use
of human rights language.").
99. See ICCPR, supra note 95, arts. 19(3), 20(2); ICERD, supra note 97. For the
full texts of these provisions, see infra text accompanying note 106 (ICCPR 13); text
accompanying note 140 (ICCPR 20(2)); and note 150 (ICERD 4).
100. See Aswad 2018, supra note 13, at 64 ("Given that an international human
rights court solely dedicated to adjudicating ICCPR rights does not exist, the U.N.
machinery's recommended interpretations of U.N. [free speech] standards have come
primarily from the Human Rights Committee, the Special Rapporteur, and (occasionally)
certain high-profile, non-binding consensus resolutions adopted by U.N. member states.").
101. The U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) reached this conclusion at least as
far back as 1997, stating that "restrictions on expression which may fall within the scope
of Article 20 must also be permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3." Ross v. Canada,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, Judgment U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., at 14, (2000).
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- and is subordinate to - the more speech-protective language of
ICCPR 19(3).
Although various U.N. officials and bodies continue to issue reports
that do not clearly, consistently adhere to ICCPR 19(3)'s strict
requirements, notable experts construe the overall historical pattern
throughout the U.N. regime as reflecting "an evolution in the U.N.
machinery's interpretations toward greater speech protections," 2
paralleling the same evolution of U.S. First Amendment law. In fact, at the
time that the U.N. General Assembly adopted both the ICERD and the
ICCPR, the Supreme Court was still in the process of building its current
speech-protective jurisprudence, and many speech-suppressive precedents
remained the law of the land. 10 3 Accordingly, when U.N. officials and
bodies later began to more consistently construe the key U.N. treaty
provisions in a more speech-protective way, they were following the same
general trajectory as the Supreme Court.
In a 2019 report, the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech provided the
following "summary of [U.N.] instruments on hate speech," stressing the
speech-protective trend, specifically toward hate speech, that is reflected
in recent and current U.N. free speech law:
The international human rights framework has evolved in recent years to
rationalize what appear, on the surface, to be competing norms.
[R]estrictions on ... freedom of expression must be exceptional, and the
State bears the burden of demonstrating the consistency of such
restrictions with international law; prohibitions under [ICCPR] Article
20 ... and [ICERD] Article 4 ... must be subject to the strict and narrow
conditions established under [ICCPR] Article 19(3) . .. , and States
should generally deploy tools . . . other than criminalization and
prohibition, such as education, counter-speech and the promotion of
pluralism, to address all kinds of hate speech.14

B. ICCPR Article 19
As the foregoing overview explains, ICCPR Article 19 is the key
provision that governs all speech restrictions under U.N. law. It provides:

102.
103.

Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 634.
See infra note 143.

104.

2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 28.
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1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of
others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.105

For any speech restriction to pass muster under ICCPR 19(3), the
relevant government must demonstrate that it satisfies all three elements
of that provision's three-part test. These three elements are usually labeled
"legitimacy," "legality," and "necessity." Their meanings are summarized
as follows:
1. Legitimacy. This term signifies that any speech restriction must be
designed to promote a purpose that is considered legitimate or
permissible: specifically, one of the important public purposes that
ICCPR 19(3)(a) and (b) enumerate: "the rights or reputations of others,"
"national security," "public order (ordre public)106" and "public health or

105. ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 19.
106. See Letter from Brian Burdekin, Fed. Hum. Rts. Comm'r, Hum. Rts. & Equal
Opportunity Comm'n, to Nick Bolkus, Minister for Admin. Servs., Parliament (May 20,
1991)
(addressing
initial
submission on
proposed
ban on political
advertising), http://www.humanrights.gov.au/right-freedom-information-opinion-andexpression-0#Submissions.
[The term "ordre public"] is clearly wider than the concept of 'public order' in
the sense usually understood in Anglo-Australian law (dealing with prevention
of breaches of the peace, offensive behaviour etc). It extends to the sum of rules
which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on
which society is founded. It equates with the 'police power' in United States
jurisprudence, permitting regulation in the interests of legitimate public
purposes. This power must itself, however be exercised in a manner consistent
with human rights.
Id. at 12.
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morals."107 Moreover, these purposes may not be invoked as mere
pretexts; governments must show that any speech restriction is designed
to, and does, promote one or more of them. 108 Although the specified
legitimate purposes seem quite expansive and malleable, they have been
interpreted relatively narrowly by the U.N. Human Rights Committee
(HRC) 109 and the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech. For example, the
HRC has clarified that the "rights ... of others" refers specifically to the
rights protected under the ICCPR and other elements of U.N. human
rights law." Likewise, while "public morals" is a potentially elastic
concept, the HRC and Special Rapporteur on Free Speech have stressed
that it must be determined according to the "universality of human rights
and the principle of non-discrimination," and must not "be based on
principles . . . deriving exclusively from a single tradition."111
2. Legality. This term refers to the requirement that any restriction must
be "provided by law," which has been construed to mean that the law
must be "adopted by regular legal processes," and written "with
sufficient precision." 1 2 These requirements serve to "limit government
discretion" in enforcing such a restriction, while also providing adequate
guidance to individuals subject to it.113
3. Necessity. This term refers to the requirement that any restriction
must be "necessary," and the least restrictive alternative, to promote one
or more of the enumerated legitimate purposes. U.N. officials and bodies
with authority to interpret ICCPR 19 sometimes use the term

107. See Gen. Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression,
Hum. Rts. Comm. on Its One Hundred-Second Session, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, ¶ 22
(2011) [hereinafter Gen. Comment 34] (stating that "[r]estrictions are not allowed on
grounds not specified" in ICCPR 19(3), "even if such grounds would justify restrictions to
other rights protected" under the ICCPR).
108. Id ¶30.
109. The HRC is the body of independent experts elected by the ICCPR's state
parties - the nations that have explicitly consented to be bound by the ICCPR - with
authority to monitor the state parties' compliance with the ICCPR and to recommend
interpretations of it. Human Rights Committee, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM'R,

http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/ccpr/pages/ccprindex.aspx
2021).
110.

111.
112.
113.

(last visited Feb.

19,

See Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107.

Id ¶ 28; accord2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12,
2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 7.
Id

¶ 7.
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The foregoing three requisite elements for a permissible speech
restriction under U.N. law expressly correspond to two of the three key
requirements for a permissible speech restriction under U.S. law, as
explained above." The U.N. legitimacy requirement parallels the U.S.
requirement that the law must have an important purpose (one element of
the strict scrutiny/emergency tests). The U.N. legality requirement
parallels the U.S. requirement that the law must be written in a narrowly
tailored fashion, to avoid undue vagueness. Finally, the U.N. necessity
requirement parallels the U.S. requirement that the law must be necessary
to promote its important purpose, and the least speech-restrictive means
for doing so (the second element of the strict scrutiny/emergency tests).
C.

General Comment 34

The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is the body of independent
experts, elected by the ICCPR's state parties, with authority to monitor
compliance with the ICCPR and to recommend interpretations of it.116 The
HRC most comprehensively laid out its strict construction of ICCPR
114.
See, e.g., Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107, ¶ 34; Gen. Comment No. 27,
Hum. Rts. Comm. on Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, ¶ 14
(1999) [hereinafter Gen. Comment 27].
115. See supra at text accompanying notes 84-94. While ICCPR 19(3)'s three
prerequisites for speech restrictions do not explicitly affirm the essential viewpoint/content
neutrality principle in U.S. law, it can plausibly be argued that the legitimacy requirement
does so implicitly. Consistent with that requirement, any speech-restricting measure must
actually be designed to promote an important public purpose that is among the limited set
of such purposes enumerated in 19(3). A viewpoint/content-based measure, by definition,
restricts speech solely to suppress its disfavored viewpoint or content; that purpose is not
even legitimate, let alone one of the enumerated important public purposes in 19(3).
Therefore, a viewpoint-based restriction would necessarily violate not only the
viewpoint/content neutrality principle in U.S. law, but also 19(3)'s legitimacy requirement
in U.N. law.
Even beyond the fact that the viewpoint/content neutrality principle is implicitly reflected
in 19(3), U.N. reports have also expressly construed the pertinent U.N. materials and
interpretations as reflecting this principle. For example, in his 2012 report on hate speech,
Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Frank La Rue said, "international law prohibits some
forms of speech for their consequences, and not for their content as such." 2012 Special
Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 22, at ¶ 46.
116.

Human Rights Committee, supra note 109.
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19(3)'s prerequisites for permissible speech restrictions in its General
Comment 34, issued in 2011, following years of study, debate, and
discussion among the HRC members, civil society, and nations around the
world."' General Comment 34 also drew upon the analyses in multiple
prior HRC reports, stressing that all three of Article 19(3)'s requirements
are "strict,"118 and that governments have a heavy burden of demonstrating
that each one is satisfied in order to justify any speech restriction. 119
General Comment 34 makes clear the many parallels between the
speech-protective elements of more recent U.N. and U.S. free speech law.
First, both bodies of law place the burden on the government to
demonstrate that any speech-restricting measure complies with all
prerequisites for permissibility,120 and they both entitle the government to
no deference regarding these determinations.121 For example, it does not
suffice for the government to assert a proper purpose for the measure;
rather, the government must show that the measure actually is designed to
promote such a purpose and indeed does so.12 2 Moreover, in language
highly resonant with the U.S. emergency and strict scrutiny tests, General
Comment 34 states that, even when the government asserts a proper
purpose for restricting speech - i.e., a concern that the speech poses a
particular threat to one of the important public interests enumerated in
ICCPR 19(3)'s legitimacy requirement - the government still may not
restrict the speech unless it can "demonstrate in specific and individualized
fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and
proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a
direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat." 1 2 3

117.

Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107.

118. Id ¶¶23, 30, 48.
119. Id¶ 27.
120. Id ("It is for the State party to demonstrate the legal basis for any restrictions
imposed on the freedom of expression.").
121. Id ¶ 36 (reaffirming that government is not entitled to a "margin of
appreciation" in assessing whether a speech restriction complies with ICCPR 19(3), unlike
the less speech-protective enforcement scheme in European law).
122. Id ¶ 22 ("Restrictions must be applied only for those purposes for which they
were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they are
predicated."). See also id. ¶ 36 ("[A] State party ... must demonstrate in specific fashion
the precise nature of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds . . . that has caused it to
restrict freedom of expression.").
123. Id ¶35.
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In yet another key parallel with the U.S. emergency and strict scrutiny
tests, General Comment 34 expressly incorporates the least restrictive
alternative requirement in a rigorous, two-step fashion. First, it stipulates
that governments may not restrict speech at all "if the protection" from the
feared harm "could be achieved in other ways that do not restrict freedom
of expression."1 2 4 Second, even if the government shows that it is
necessary to impose some restriction on speech, it must additionally show
that the particular restriction at issue is "the least intrusive" option
"amongst those which might achieve" the government's goal. 125
Just as General Comment 34 closely corresponds to U.S. law's
emergency and strict scrutiny tests, it also closely corresponds to U.S.
law's requirement that a speech restriction must be formulated with
"narrowly tailored" language to avoid undue vagueness. Specifically,
General Comment 34 construed ICCPR 19(3)'s legality requirement (that
any restriction must be "provided by law") to embody these same criteria,
explaining that, "a norm, to be characterized as a 'law,' must be formulated
with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her
conduct accordingly . .
A law may not confer unfettered discretion for
the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its
execution."

1 26

D. The hate speech restrictionsmandatedin ICCPR 20(2)
andICERD 4 must comply with the strict limits that
ICCPR 19(3) specifies for any speech restrictions
As indicated above, notwithstanding ICCPR 19(3)'s strong general
protection of free speech and its strict general limits upon any speech
restrictions, two significant provisions in U.N. treaties specifically focus
on certain hate speech, expressly requiring governments to outlaw it:
ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4.127 While these two provisions certainly could
be viewed as being in tension with ICCPR 19(3), the most recent
124. Id ¶33.
125. Id ¶ 34. See also 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 7
("States must demonstrate that the restriction imposes the least burden on the exercise of
the right and actually protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest at issue.
States may not merely assert necessity, but must demonstrate it, [both] in the adoption of
restrictive legislation and the restriction of specific expression.").
126.
Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107, ¶ 25.
127.

See ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 20(2); ICERD, supra note 97.
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interpretations by U.N. officials and bodies that expressly address this
issue repeatedly have construed them as consistent with - specifically, as
subject to - ICCPR 19(3).
Regarding ICCPR 20(2), General Comment 34 declared, "a limitation
that is justified on the basis of [ICCPR] 20 must also comply with [ICCPR]
19, paragraph 3."128 General Comment 34 subsequently reiterated and
underscored this point: "In every case in which the State restricts freedom
of expression it is necessary to justify the prohibitions . . . in strict
conformity with [ICCPR] 19."1129 This conclusion has been reaffirmed in
numerous U.N. documents and by various U.N. officials and agencies,
including the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech and the HRC. 130
The foregoing conclusions of General Comment 34 about ICCPR 20(2)
were also endorsed concerning ICERD 4 by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the expert body appointed
to interpret and monitor compliance with ICERD. 131 CERD's 2013
General Recommendation 35, entitled "Combating Racist Hate Speech,"
cited the ICCPR 19(3) and General Comment 34, declaring that "freedom
of expression . . may . . be subject to certain restrictions, but only if they
are provided by law and are necessary for protection of the rights or

128. See Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107, ¶ 50 (citing Ross v. Canada, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, Judgment U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. (2000)).
129. Gen. Comment 34, supra note 107, ¶ 52. See also 2018 Special Rapporteur on
Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 8 ("Restrictions pursuant to [ICCPR] 20(2) ... must still
satisfy the cumulative conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy."). General
Comment 34 also explicitly rebuts a particular argument that the more specific provisions
in ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4 should supersede the more general language in ICCPR 19(3).
Id. ¶ 51. Specifically, the lex specialis interpretive principle stipulates that a law governing
a specific subject matter presumptively overrides a law that only governs general matters.
Id. As the pertinent text explains, "[F]or the acts addressed in [ICCPR] 20, the Covenant
indicates the specific responses required from the State: their prohibition by law. It is only
to this extent that [ICCPR] 20 may be considered as lex specialis with regard to [ICCPR]
19." Id.
130. See, e.g., 2012 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 22, ¶ 41; 2011
Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12 ¶¶ 37, 81; see also infra note 137
(describing the HRC's 2016 ruling in Rabbae v. Netherlands).
131.
U.N.

Committee on the Elimination ofRacialDiscrimination,Human Rights Bodies,
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMM'R,

http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cerd/pages/cerdindex.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
CERD is HRC's counterpart, occupying the same role vis-a-vis ICERD that HRC occupies
vis-a-vis ICCPR.
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reputations of others and for the protection of national security or of public
order, or of public health or morals." 132
As noted above, prominent experts have concluded that the U.N.'s free
speech standards have evolved toward more speech protection. Those
experts flag General Comment 34 and General Recommendation 35 as
critical elements in this evolution, which are entitled to significant weight
given the lengthy, deliberative processes that gave rise to them.
Accordingly, such experts maintain that these general interpretive
documents should be read as implicitly superseding prior inconsistent, less
speech-protective U.N. documents that also construe the pertinent treaty
provisions.
For example,
Professor Aswad
views
General
Recommendation 35's narrow concept of punishable hate speech - one
that integrates ICCPR 19(3)'s strict limits on any speech restriction - in
this light:
This General Recommendation should be viewed as an evolution in the
[CERD] Committee's thinking on bans on racist hate speech rather than
an inconsistency in its jurisprudence. Before issuing formal
recommended interpretations of treaties, U.N. treaty committee
members engage in a consultation process that canvases the views of
State Parties and civil society organizations. After such consultations,
committees hold intensive deliberations that can take years before
issuing the committee's ultimate views. Such a period of intensive
deliberation and reflection can easily mark a turning point and evolution
in the U.N. CERD Committee's thinking on Article 4, just as seminal
cases decided over a prolonged period can spark transitions in a domestic
court's jurisprudence. 13 3

As this Article's next section details, recent U.N. reports that
specifically focus on hate speech, issued by multiple U.N. expert bodies
and individuals, have carefully adhered to the speech-protective
interpretations of the three pertinent treaty provisions in General Comment
34 (as echoed in CERD General Recommendation 35). These reports have
stressed that government has only narrow authority to regulate hate
speech, while urging greater reliance on non-censorial measures
132.
Gen. Recommendation 35, supra note 23, ¶ 26. See also id. ¶ 12 (stating that
"the application of criminal sanctions" to hate speech under ICERD 4 "should be governed
by principles of legality, proportionality, and necessity," the three-part test delineated in
ICCPR 19(3)).
133.

Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 639.
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addressing the root causes of hateful and discriminatory attitudes, as well
as measures that outlaw discriminatory or violent conduct.
For example, the U.N.'s most recent, most detailed report on point, its
2020 Detailed Guidance on Implementation of the U.N. Strategy and Plan
of Action on Hate Speech (the "Detailed Guidance"), endorsed this
speech-protective approach, including in the specific context of the
Platforms' content moderation policies. 134 Moreover, the Special
Rapporteur on Free Speech issued two reports, in 2018 and 2019,
concluding that Platforms should align their content moderation policies
with General Comment 34 and other speech-protective elements of U.N.
free speech law. Both of these Special Rapporteur reports stress that hate
speech should be restricted only in narrow, exceptional circumstances,
while most hate speech, along with hateful attitudes and actions, should be
addressed through non-censorial measures.135 Additional important recent
materials, issued by multiple U.N. bodies, have also adhered to this narrow
concept of punishable hate speech. 136
To be sure, not all U.N. reports that address free speech/hate speech
issues have clearly and consistently adhered to the speech-protective
interpretations of the treaty provisions that General Comment 34 spells out

134. See infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 156-61.
136. See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 226 (noting that the HRC has issued only one
decision addressing the merits of an ICCPR 20(2) claim, in which it held that the
Netherlands' strict concept of punishable incitement, which was very similar to the strict
U.S. standard under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969), complied with
ICCPR 20(2); therefore, Cleveland concluded that "this brings [ICCPR] 20 closer to
Brandenburg"). See also Babbae v. Netherlands, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/11'7/D/2124/2011,
Judgment U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. (2016); Aswad 2020, supra note 2, at 625 n.64

(describing Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18, adopted by consensus in 2011 to
address intolerance based on religion or belief, and noting that it "call[s] upon states to ban
offensive and hateful speech in only one instance - incitement to imminent violence").
Another important example, noted in Special Rapporteur on Free Speech David Kaye's
2018 report, is the Rabat Plan of Action. See 2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech,
supra note 4, ¶ 68.2. Adopted through an extensive consultative process involving fortyfive experts from different cultural backgrounds and legal traditions and convened by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2011-2012, the Rabat Plan of Action
detailed standards for permissible prohibitions on incitement to national, racial, or religious
hatred consistent with ICCPR 19 and 20 and ICERD 4. Id.
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and that General Recommendation 35 echoes. 137 Therefore, proponents of
basing the Platforms' content moderation standards on speech-protective
U.N. free speech norms must continue to promote those norms within the
U.N. system, applauding U.N. reports that do so, 138 while critiquing those
137. The author of this article thanks Natalie Alkiviadou, Paul Coleman, and Jacob
Mchangama for calling to her attention some recent HRC and CERD country reports that,
in their view, do not evaluate countries' hate speech restrictions sufficiently strictly in
accordance with those very bodies' general interpretations of the pertinent treaty provisions
in General Comment 34 and General Recommendation 35, respectively. See, e.g., Hum.
Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of Czechia, ¶¶ 16-17,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4 (2019); Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on
the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Belgium, ¶¶ 19-20, U.N. Doc. CCPRC/BEL/CO/6 (2019);
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the
Combined Twenty-First to Twenty-Third Periodic Rep. of the U.K. of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, ¶¶ 15-17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GBR/CO21-23 (2016); Comm. on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the Combined
Nineteenth to Twenty-Second Periodic Reports of Germany, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/DEU/CO/19-22 (2015); Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reports of the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO7-9 (2014); Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Germany, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6 (2012).
The author has not systematically evaluated this aspect of all country reports by HRC and
CERD, or by the Special Rapporteur for Free Speech, and she is not aware of anyone else
who has done so.
138. The Special Rapporteur on Free Speech has issued country-monitoring reports
that do rigorously evaluate hate speech measures consistent with ICCPR 19(3) and General
Comment 34. For example, Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye's 2019 report on
Ethiopia concluded that the draft of Ethiopia's Hate Speech and Disinformation
Proclamation "goes far beyond the command of [ICCPR] 20(2) and the limitations on
restrictions required by [ICCPR] 19(3)," and thus raises concerns that it "will exacerbate
ethnic tension, which . . may fuel further violence." David Kaye, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF.
HIGH

COMM'R

(Dec.

2019),

https://www.ohchr.orhg/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25402&Lan
dlD=E.
Kaye also strongly urged a range of non-censorial alternatives as being both consistent with
the U.N. treaty provisions and more likely to be effective in countering ethnic tension and
violence. Id. Moreover, he stressed that the prior Special Rapporteur on Free Speech had
reached the same conclusions in the context of multiple other country reports:
[ICCPR] 20(2) provides a specific and internationally-recognized definition of hateful
advocacy, which international mechanisms have interpreted. The mandate [i.e., the Special
Rapporteur] has found the language of "hate speech," untethered from [ICCPR] 20(2), to
be problematic over the course of many years. My predecessor found it common that legal
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that fall short. Such proponents must also press Platforms to rigorously
align their content moderation policies with General Comment 34 and
General Recommendation 35.
E. ICCPR 20(2) requires governments to outlaw only
certain designated hate speech
The most important limit on the mandated hate speech restrictions
under ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4 is the requirement just discussed, that
any such restrictions must comply with the strict legitimacy, legality, and
necessity requirements under ICCPR 19(3) and elaborated in General
Comment 34. It is also noteworthy that, even on its face, ICCPR 20(2)
calls for outlawing only a subset of hate speech, which is significantly
narrower than the concept of illegal hate speech in many countries' laws.
ICCPR 20(2) provides that, "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law." 139 This language is not as narrow as
the U.S. had urged, with the support of many countries from various
regions, during the treaty negotiations,1 4 ' but still far narrower than the
original Soviet proposal. 14 1 The U.S. sought to confine the provision to
outlawing incitement to violence - a standard that was more speechprotective than what U.S. First Amendment law then required.142 In
frameworks attempting to regulate hate speech risked interfering, and in fact did interfere,
with freedom of expression principles, when insufficiently grounded in international
human rights law.
Id (citing 2012 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 22).
The author of this Article has not systematically reviewed all country-monitoring reports
by the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, nor is she aware of anyone else who has done
so.
139.

ICCPR, supra note 95, 20(2).

140. See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 224 (noting that the U.S.'s strong free speech
position was supported "by many states, including other advanced Western democracies,
as well as a number of Latin American states, Lebanon, Japan, and others").
141. Id at 221. Likewise, a Soviet proposal for a broad definition of punishable hate
speech in the 1948 Genocide Convention was also rejected in favor of the narrow definition
that the U.S. had advocated. See id. at 216.
142. Throughout the ICCPR drafting process - from 1945 until 1954 - U.S. free
speech law embodied a broader, more malleable concept of punishable incitement than the
narrow concept that the U.S. had advocated for the ICCPR. Not until 1969 -three years
after the U.N. General Assembly adopted the ICCPR - did the Supreme Court explicitly
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contrast, the Soviets sought to criminalize "all racist and nationalist
propaganda."14 3 Ultimately, the adopted language is significantly more
speech-protective than the Soviet proposal in two respects: it rejects both
the requirement of criminalization and the broad, vague definition of the
targeted expression.
As adopted, ICCPR 20(2) singles out not only "advocacy of hatred,"
but also advocacy that "constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence." 14 4 The four italicized words in ICCPR 20(2) have quite
limited, specific meanings. This significant point was stressed in an
important U.N. guidance, the "Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence" (the "Rabat Plan of Action"). The
Rabat Plan of Action was adopted in 2012 under the auspices of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, as the result of a consultative
process involving forty-five experts from different cultural backgrounds
and legal traditions. 14 5 Construing ICCPR 20(2)'s language, the Rabat Plan
of Action stated:
[T]he terms "hatred" and "hostility" refer to intense and irrational
emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target
group; the term "advocacy" is to be understood as requiring an intention
to promote hatred publicly towards the target group; and the term
"incitement" refers to statements about national, racial or religious
limit this category of punishable speech to expression that intentionally incited imminent
violent or lawless conduct that is likely to occur. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). Before Brandenburg,the Court had permitted government to punish speech due to
its feared "bad tendency." See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)
(upholding the federal Smith Act, which made it a crime "to knowingly . .. advocate . .
or teach the . . . propriety of overthrowing . . . any government in the United States by
Force or violence").
Professor Sarah Cleveland has explained that the U.S. insisted on stronger free speech
protection under U.N. law than what existed under U.S. law as a prophylactic measure,
because the U.N. "principles would often be applied in states with weaker traditions of free
speech and press and judicial independence." Cleveland, supra note 18, at 224. This is a
noteworthy argument that, far from being less speech-protective than U.S. law, U.N. law
should be more speech-protective.
143.

Cleveland, supra note 18, at 221.

144.

ICCPR, supra note 95, 20(2) (emphasis added).

145.

Freedom of Expression vs Incitement to Hatred: OHCHR and the Rabat Plan
Action,
U.N.
HUM.
RTS.
OFF.
HIGH
COMM'R,

of
https://www.ohchr.org.EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/Index.aspx
visited Feb. 19, 2021).

(last
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groups which create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or
violence against persons belonging to those groups. 14 6

In 2012, then-Special Rapporteur for Free Speech Frank La Rue also
stressed the narrow meanings of ICCPR 20(2)'s key terms. Specifically,
La Rue concluded, "the following elements [are] essential when
determining whether an expression constitutes incitement to hatred: real
and imminent danger of violence resulting from the expression; [and the]
intent of the speaker to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence." 14 La
Rue cautioned, "since not all types of inflammatory, hateful or offensive
speech amount to incitement," the broad general concept of hate speech
"should not be conflated" with the specific subset of such speech that
ICCPR 20(2) requires governments to outlaw. 14 8
ICCPR 20(2)'s relatively limited concept of proscribable hate speech
can be appreciated by contrasting it with ICERD 4.149 The latter requires
146. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts. on the Expert Workshops on the
Prohibition of Incitement to Nat'l, Racial or Religious Hatred, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/17/ADD.4, at 10 n.5 (2013).

147. 2012 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 22, at ¶ 46. See also id. at
¶ 44(e) ("'Hostility' is a manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind"); id. ¶ 50(b)
("No one should be penalized for the dissemination of hate speech unless it has been shown
that they did so with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.").
Incorporating the foregoing narrow definitions of ICCPR 20(2)'s key terms from the Rabat
Plan of Action and the Special Rapporteur on Free Speech into ICCPR 20(2)'s language,
the result is that ICCPR 20(2) requires governments to outlaw only expression that (1)
intentionally promotes intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and
detestation towards the target national, racial, or religious group, which constitute a
manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind, and (2) creates an imminent risk of
causing such intense and irrational emotions, or discrimination or violence against persons
belonging to those groups.
148. Id. ¶ 49; see also 2011 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 28
(noting that, for speech to be subject to regulation under ICCPR 20(2), there must be a
"very close link between the expression and the resulting risk of discrimination, hostility
or violence"); see also Detailed Guidance, supranote 3, at 13 (explaining that ICCPR 20(2)
and ICERD 4 require "an intention to promote hatred publicly towards the target group"
and "statements which create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence").
149. The full text of [ICERD] 4 provides:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
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governments to outlaw not only "incitement to discrimination," as in
ICCPR 20(2),150 but also the "dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred."1 5 1 On the one hand, ICERD 4's language expressly
calls for outlawing a broader category of hate speech than does ICCPR
20(2).152 However, ICERD 4 also qualifies its entire definition of
proscribable hate speech with its "due regard clause." This clause
stipulates that any action under ICERD 4 must be undertaken "with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in [ICERD] 5 .... " The rights
expressly set forth in ICERD 5 include "[t]he right to freedom of opinion
and expression." Although the U.S. had expressed concern about ICERD
4's potential inconsistency with freedom of speech while it was being
negotiated, the U.S. ultimately voted in favor of ICERD 4 specifically
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination
and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to
racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and
shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence
punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to
promote or incite racial discrimination.
ICERD, supra note 97.
150.

ICCPR, supra note 95, 20(2).

151. ICERD, supra note 97, art. IV(a).
152. Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of ICERD's "dissemination" clause,
General Recommendation 35 indicates that this clause should be construed as narrowly as
the "incitement" clause. Gen. Recommendation 35, supra note 23, ¶ 16 (explaining that
"incitement offenses" should turn on the speaker's "intention" and "the imminent risk or
likelihood that the conduct" that the speaker intended "will result from the speech in
question," and concluding that these "considerations . . . also apply to the other offences"
under ICERD 4, including "dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or
hatred."). See also id. ¶ 25 (stating that expression "in the context of academic debates,
political engagement or similar activity" may not be punished unless it constitutes
"incitement to hatred, contempt, violence or discrimination.").
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because of its due regard clause. 153 In practice, however, U.N. officials and
bodies have not consistently enforced this clause to strictly constrain hate
speech restrictions.
It bears repeating that the most important constraint on hate speech
restrictions under both ICCPR 20(2) and ICERD 4 is the requirement
under General Comment 34 and General Recommendation 35,
respectively - that all such restrictions must comport with ICCPR 19(3),
including by constituting the least restrictive alternative to advance a
specified important public purpose. In short, the strict ICCPR 19(3)
requirementsfor any speech restriction are, in effect, incorporatedinto
and strongly qualzfy the express language of both ICCPR 20(2) and
ICERD 4.
VI. MULTIPLE RECENT REPORTS BY U.N. BODIES AND OFFICIALS HAVE
CALLED FOR THE PLATFORMS' CONTENT MODERATION POLICIES
(INCLUDING THEIR HATE SPEECH POLICIES) TO BE CONSISTENT WITH
SPEECH-PROTECTIVE U.N. STANDARDS

In a 2018 report, Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye urged the
Platforms to adhere to U.N. free speech norms, in accordance with the
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the "Guiding
Principles"), which the U.N. Human Rights Council 154 adopted

153. See Draft Int'l Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 152,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1318 (1965) ("[The U.S. delegate] emphasized that her delegation
had been able to support the text only on the understanding that . .
article IV did not
impose on a State Party the obligation to take any action impairing the right to freedom of
speech and freedom of association.") To underscore this understanding, the U.S.
ratification of ICERD was subject to a reservation, specifying that the U.S. "does not accept
any obligation . .. to restrict" "individual freedom of speech, expression and association.
.. to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Int'l Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted by State
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (2000).
154. The Council consists of forty-seven Member States that are elected by the
majority of members of the U.N. General Assembly. Membership of Human Rights
Council,

U.N.

HUM.

RTS.

COUNCIL,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/membership.aspx (last visited Feb. 19,
2021). The Council's membership is based on a geographical distribution formula,
allocating specified numbers of seats among different regions of the world. Id. Members
serve for three years and are not eligible for immediate re-election after serving two
consecutive terms. Id.
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unanimously in 2011.1" While acknowledging that the Guiding Principles
are non-binding, Kaye explained that the Platforms' "overwhelming role
in public life globally argues strongly for . . . [them to] . . . adopt[] and
implement[]" these Principles. 156 Stressing the strong protection that
ICCPR 19(3) accords to controversial speech, including hate speech, the
report maintained that the Platforms should permit "users to develop
opinions, express themselves freely and access information of all kinds in
a manner consistent with human rights law."1 5 7
In 2019, Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye issued another report
that renewed the call for the Platforms to align their content moderation
policies with U.N. law, specifically applying that recommendation to the
Platforms' hate speech policies. 158 This report repeatedly stressed the
importance of counter speech as an appropriate and effective alternative to
speech restrictions. For example, the report stated: "While . . . [online]
companies should combat [hateful] attitudes with education, condemnation
and other tools, legal restrictions [on hateful expression] will need to meet the
strict standards of international human rights law." 159 The report specifically
endorsed "as alternatives . . . to the banning of accounts and the removal of
content," the following non-censorial measures against hate speech: "tools
that promote individual autonomy, security and free expression," which
"involve de-amplification, de-monetization, education, counter-speech,
reporting and training. 1 60
In September 2020, these same points were reiterated by the U.N.'s
Detailed Guidance. 161 While the Detailed Guidance applies to hate speech
in all contexts, it expressly explains that one important and specific context
in which it applies is the Platforms' content moderation policies.
155. Keeping Momentum: One Year in the life of UN Human Rights Council, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Sept.
22, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/22/keepingmomentum/one-year-life-un-human-rights-council.
156. 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 5; accord Benesch,
supra note 20, at 90 (recognizing that the Guiding Principles call on companies to "respect"
U.N. human rights law, but maintaining that "companies like Facebook should not only
respect the law but [also] comply with it, due to their vast regulation of speech, especially
public discourse"). See also Land 2013, supra note 66, at 447 (arguing that the Platforms
are directly bound to respect users' free speech rights under ICCPR 19).
157. 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 45.
158. 2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4 passim.
159. Id ¶ 19.
160. Id ¶58(f).
161.

See Aswad 2020, supra note 2.
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Specifically, the Detailed Guidance stresses that the Platforms may only
regulate hate speech consistent with the strict, speech-protective U.N.
standards.1 1 2 Noting the necessity/least restrictive alternative prerequisites
for suppressing any speech - including hate speech - the Detailed
Guidance quotes the key passage from the 2019 Special Rapporteur on
Free Speech report, quoted in the preceding paragraph. 16 3 In short, the
Detailed Guidance maintains that the Platforms should not remove hate
speech or ban accounts for posting hate speech except as the last resort.
VII. THE PLATFORMS' CONTENT MODERATION POLICIES GOVERNING
HATE SPEECH LIKELY VIOLATE U.N. FREE SPEECH STANDARDS

Because the Platforms are constantly revising their content moderation
policies, including those regarding hate speech, this Article errs on the side
of caution in asserting only that such policies "likely" violate U.N. free
speech standards. Moreover, since the Platforms ramped up their
restrictions on hate speech only recently, and since the calls for them to
align those restrictions with U.N. standards are also quite recent, the
process of elaborating on appropriate Platform hate speech policies is
likewise at its incipient stage. Encouragingly, civil society organizations
and individual experts are increasingly engaging in this crucial process.164
Even at this early stage, however, there is ample basis to conclude that the
Platforms' hate speech policies do not adhere to U.N. standards.
As discussed above, public officials and community members across
the political and ideological spectrum complain that Platforms unjustly
suppress online expression, particularly in situations in which the violative
nature of the suppressed speech is unclear to the Platforms' users. 16 5 These
complaints indicate that the Platforms' content moderation policies run
afoul of, at least, the legality requirement of U.N. free speech law as
unduly vague formulations that are not narrowly tailored.
Eminent international human rights law experts have undertaken
detailed analyses of some Platform hate speech policies, specifying how
those policies fall short of the prerequisites for permissible speech
162. Detailed Guidance, supra note 3, ¶ 68.2 (calling on "tech and social media
companies" to "[a]lign their content policies on hate speech with international human rights
norms and standards, including the Rabat Plan of Action").
163. Id. ¶68.6.
164.
165.

See supranote 21.
See supratext accompanying notes 51-63.
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restrictions under U.N. law. For example, Special Rapporteur on Free
Speech Kaye's 2018 report flagged unduly vague policies violative of
ICCPR 19(3)'s legality requirement, including Twitter's then-prohibition
on speech that "incites fear about a protected group." Kaye found Twitter's
policy illustrative of several Platforms' "policies on hate, harassment, and
abuse," concluding that such policies "do not clearly indicate what
constitutes an offence." 166
Moreover, in Kaye's 2019 report, which specifically focused on hate
speech, he concluded with a more general indictment of the Platforms'
hate speech content moderation policies and practices, stating that the
Platforms "manage hate speech . . . almost entirely without reference to
the human rights implications."1 6 ? Likewise, a 2018 "Policy Brief," issued
by the international free speech organization Article 19, analyzed the hate
speech restrictions enforced by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google,
and concluded that "their policies overall fall below [the U.N.'s]
international standards on freedom of expression. "168
Sadly, the failure of the Platforms' hate speech policies to comply with
ICCPR 19(3)'s legality requirement has an especially adverse impact on
the very minority groups that those policies are intended to protect. As
Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye's 2018 report concluded: "The
vagueness of hate speech and harassment policies has triggered complaints
of inconsistent policy enforcement that penalizes minorities while
reinforcing the status of dominant or powerful groups." 169
An especially in-depth assessment of a Platform hate speech policy was
undertaken by Professor Aswad.170 In a 2018 article, Aswad laid out
detailed criteria for evaluating whether any social media company's hate
speech policy complies with U.N. free speech law. For example, to comply
with the necessity requirement, she "proposes that a company would need
..
to publicly commit to three steps." 171 Significantly, this three-step

166. 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 26.
167. 2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 42.
168. ARTICLE 19, supra note 11, at 18. See also Benesch, supra note 20, at 103
(concluding that "most platforms' [content moderation] rules manifestly do not meet" the
legality requirement).
169. 2018 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 12, ¶ 26.
170. Aswad holds the Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law at the
University of Oklahoma's College of Law, and previously served as the director of the
human rights law office at the U.S. Department of State.

171.

Aswad 2018, supra note 13, at 47.
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analysis for assessing whether a Platform's content moderation policy
complies with the necessity requirement under U.N. free speech law was
explicitly endorsed in Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye's 2019
report:

17 2

Evelyn Aswad identifies three steps that a company should take under
the necessity framework: [1] evaluate the tools it has available to protect
a legitimate objective without interfering with the speech itself; [2]
identify the tool that least intrudes on speech; and [3] assess whether and
demonstrate that the measure it selects actually achieves its goals. This
kind of evaluation is in line with the call made in the Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights for businesses to ensure that they prevent
or mitigate harms. 173

Elaborating on the first element of the necessity assessment, Professor
Aswad explained that, as an alternative to restricting speech, Platforms
"can . . . speak out on issues, educate users, and promote dialogue."1 7 4
Turning to the second element, Professor Aswad explained that, if these
non-censorial alternatives proved ineffective so that the Platform would
have to resort to some speech suppression, then it "should carefully
develop a continuum of options . . . and commit publicly to selecting the
least intrusive" among them:
For example, a company could give its users a means to opt out of
offensive material. [Or] a company [could] avoid[] giving problematic
posts a circulation boost, but ... not delete them or affect its users' ability
to circulate the posts. A company could also lower the ranking of
problematic posts in search results or otherwise decrease their visibility
...
Where speech must be banned, geo-blocking ...
a particular post
from view in the particular country could be considered (rather than
removing the information from the platform). A more intrusive
infringement ... would be to delete a post but to allow the speaker to
continue to speak on the platform. Warnings could be issued to a user
who repeatedly violates a company's speech code before taking more

2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 52.

172.
173.

Id.

174.

Aswad 2018, supra note 13, at 48.
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severe measures. The most extreme end of the continuum may be
blocking a user's account in egregious situations.17 5

Finally, concerning the third element, Aswad explains that a Platform
should "diligently monitor[] whether the measure it has selected is"
actually effective, without "negative unintended consequences that may
outweigh the desired benefits."1 7 6
Applying the necessity requirement to Twitter's hate speech policy
through such a rigorous analysis, Professor Aswad concludes that the
policy fails. 77 Undertaking a similarly probing analysis of Twitter's hate
speech policy under U.N. free speech law's legality requirement, Professor
Aswad concludes that the policy likely also fails this element of ICCPR
19(3)'s three-part test. 178
A 2020 article by Professors Molly Land and Rebecca Hamilton, aptly
entitled Beyond Takedown, well complements Professor Aswad's analysis
of U.N. free speech law's necessity/least restrictive alternative
requirement, as endorsed by Special Rapporteur on Free Speech Kaye.
Land and Hamilton lay out many specific non-censorial components ofthe
Platforms' potential "toolkit for responding to online hate," which
"involve a broader range of actors [beyond the Platforms themselves], and
which draw on a mix of online and offline methods both to prevent hate
speech before it occurs and to minimize its impact after it occurs." 179 Their
intriguing suggestions, drawing on actual initiatives that have been
implemented by Platforms and civil society organizations, are grouped
into three categories: the Platforms' technical design features; user
education; and counterspeech. For example, Land and Hamilton suggest
that the Platforms should explore the following technical design features:
Platforms could be designed in ways that work to minimize the online
disinhibition effect, such as through the use of cues reminding users of
their shared humanity . . . Algorithms could be tweaked to deprioritize
particularly extreme or virulent content ... Warnings or other kinds of
prompts that question the user as to whether they really want to post
Id at 49-50.
Id at 51.
Id at 52.
Id at 46-47.
Molly Land & Rebecca Hamilton, Beyond Takedown: Expanding the Toolkit
for Responding to Online Hate, 143 PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS & INT'L LAW:
FROM COGNITION TO CRIMINALITY 1, 8 (2020).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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certain content may be enough to deter at least some of those who would
otherwise post hate speech.180
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As U.N. Special Rapporteur on Free Speech David Kaye concluded in
his 2019 report, the Platforms "have for too long avoided [U.N.] human
rights law as a guide to their rules . . ., notwithstanding the extensive
impacts they have on the human rights of their users and the public."18 1
Since the Platforms are private entities, their power to restrict users'
speech is not constrained by the First Amendment free speech guarantee,
the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee, the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection guarantee, or any other limit that the U.S. Constitution
imposes on government action. Accordingly, the Platforms may wield
their unprecedented censorial power in a manner that is substantively
arbitrary and discriminatory, and procedurally unfair. Indeed, a steady
stream of evidence demonstrates that they are in fact doing so.
Given the Platforms' preeminence as venues for free speech and for the
political discourse that is the lifeblood of democratic self-government,
their unprecedented and unconstrained censorial powers threaten essential
foundations of liberal democracies: free speech, equality, due process of
law, and the rule of law. It is crucial to pursue an alternative means to rein
in that power. A promising approach, consistent with the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, is for the Platforms to honor
and advance the key speech-protective aspects of U.N. free speech law.
Along with U.S. law, these important elements of U.N. law reflect a view
shared by many human rights advocates around the world: that the most
constructive way to combat hateful attitudes and action is through robust,
proactive, non-censorial approaches, supplemented by narrowly limited
speech restrictions.
Free speech proponents must continue to promote the speech-protective
elements of the U.N. free speech regime, urging that those elements be
more clearly and consistently implemented throughout the U.N. system,
and insisting on the Platforms' adherence to them.

180.
181.

Id. at 9.
2019 Special Rapporteur on Free Speech, supra note 4, ¶ 58.
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